Related papers: Data-Driven Persuasion

We study a Bayesian persuasion game where a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take a binary action, such as purchasing a product. The sender is informed about the (real-valued) state of the world, such as the quality of the product,…

We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an unknown state, so no sender can verify another's report. A…

The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…

We address Bayesian persuasion between a sender and a receiver with state-dependent quadratic cost measures for general classes of distributions. The receiver seeks to make mean-square-error estimate of a state based on a signal sent by the…

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form…

In the autonomous driving area, interaction between vehicles is still a piece of puzzle which has not been fully resolved. The ability to intelligently and safely interact with other vehicles can not only improve self driving quality but…

An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number of mediators, the sender's optimal value is characterized.…

I study dynamic contracting where Sender privately observes a Markovian state and seeks to motivate Receiver, who acts. Sender provides incentives in two ways: payments, which alter payoffs ex-post, and (Bayesian) persuasion, which shapes…

A sender with state-independent preferences (i.e., transparent motives) privately observes a signal about the state of the world before sending a message to a receiver, who subsequently takes an action. Regardless of whether the receiver…

We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments…

We consider a dynamic Bayesian persuasion setting where a single long-lived sender persuades a stream of ``short-lived'' agents (receivers) by sharing information about a payoff-relevant state. The state transitions are Markovian and the…

This paper addresses the question of how to best communicate information over time in order to influence an agent's belief and induced actions in a model with a binary state of the world that evolves according to a Markov process, and with…

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has been devoted to settings in which sender and receivers…

In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…

We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which distributions over empirical distributions of posteriors beliefs…

We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after…

Bayesian persuasion is the study of information sharing policies among strategic agents. A prime example is signaling in online ad auctions: what information should a platform signal to an advertiser regarding a user when selling the…

This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses…

We study a model of persuasion in which the receiver is a `conservative Bayesian' whose updated belief is a convex combination of the prior and the correct Bayesian posterior. While in the classic Bayesian case providing information…

We consider the disclosure problem of a sender with a large data set of hard evidence who wants to persuade a receiver to take higher actions. Because the receiver will make inferences based on the distribution of the data they see, the…