Related papers: Polynomial Expectation Property for Max-Polymatrix…
We consider multi-dimensional payoff functions in partially observable Markov decision processes. We study the structure of the set of expected payoff vectors of all strategies (policies) and study what kind are needed to achieve a given…
In this work, we investigate a security game between an attacker and a defender, originally proposed in \cite{emadi2019security}. As is well known, the combinatorial nature of security games leads to a large cost matrix. Therefore,…
In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…
Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…
Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not robust to errors in this specification. Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they require…
Since the seminal PPAD-completeness result for computing a Nash equilibrium even in two-player games, an important line of research has focused on relaxations achievable in polynomial time. In this paper, we consider the notion of…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
We consider the dynamics, existence and stability of the equilibrium states for large populations of individuals who can play various types of non--cooperative games. The players imitate the most attractive strategies, and the choice is…
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…
We study equilibrium computation with extensive-form correlation in two-player turn-taking stochastic games. Our main results are two-fold: (1) We give an algorithm for computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated equilibrium (SEFCE),…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
In a multi-objective game, each individual's payoff is a \emph{vector-valued} function of everyone's actions. Under such vectorial payoffs, Pareto-efficiency is used to formulate each individual's best-response condition, inducing…
In probabilistic game structures, probabilistic alternating simulation (PA-simulation) relations preserve formulas defined in probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with respect to the behaviour of a subset of players. We propose a…
We define and analyze the notion of variational Wardrop equilibrium for nonatomic aggregative games with an infinity of players types. These equilibria are characterized through an infinite-dimensional variational inequality. We show, under…
The works of (Daskalakis et al., 2009, 2022; Jin et al., 2022; Deng et al., 2023) indicate that computing Nash equilibria in multi-player Markov games is a computationally hard task. This fact raises the question of whether or not…
In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces and non-linear payoff functions. Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these…
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
In this paper, we discover that the class of random polynomials arising from the equilibrium analysis of random asymmetric evolutionary games is \textit{exactly} the Kostlan-Shub-Smale system of random polynomials, revealing an intriguing…