Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation
Computer Science and Game Theory
2014-04-04 v1 Logic in Computer Science
Abstract
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria (for qualitative objectives) in this game model.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1404.0839,
title = {Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation},
author = {Patricia Bouyer and Nicolas Markey and Steen Vester},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1404.0839},
year = {2014}
}
Comments
In Proceedings SR 2014, arXiv:1404.0414