Related papers: Truthful Facility Location with Candidate Location…
This paper explores the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem where the total facility capacity is less than the number of agents. Following the framework outlined by Aziz et al., the Social Welfare of…
We study a constrained distributed heterogeneous two-facility location problem, where a set of agents with private locations on the real line are divided into disjoint groups. The constraint means that the facilities can only be built in a…
We consider the problem of locating a public facility on a line, where a set of $n$ strategic agents report their \emph{locations} and a mechanism determines, either deterministically or randomly, the location of the facility. Game…
Our work is devoted to the metric facility location problem and addresses the selfish behavior of the players. It contributes to the line of work initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [EC09] on approximate mechanism design without money.…
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…
We focus on the problem of placing two facilities along a linear space to serve a group of agents. Each agent is committed to minimizing the distance between her location and the closest facility. A mechanism is an algorithm that maps the…
We study the classic mechanism design problem of locating a public facility on a real line. In contrast to previous work, we assume that the agents are unable to fully specify where their preferred location lies, and instead only provide…
The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in…
We consider a single-facility location problem, where agents are positioned on the real line and are partitioned into multiple disjoint districts. The goal is to choose a location (where a public facility is to be built) so as to minimize…
We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…
In many societal resource allocation domains, machine learning methods are increasingly used to either score or rank agents in order to decide which ones should receive either resources (e.g., homeless services) or scrutiny (e.g., child…
We take the classic facility location problem and consider a variation, in which each agent's individual cost function is equal to their distance from the facility multiplied by a scaling factor which is determined by the facility…
An important feature of many real world facility location problems are capacity limits on the facilities. We show here how capacity constraints make it harder to design strategy proof mechanisms for facility location, but…
In the facility location problem, the task is to place one or more facilities so as to minimize the sum of the agent costs for accessing their nearest facility. Heretofore, in the strategic version, agent locations have been assumed to be…
We consider the strategyproof facility location problem on a circle. We focus on the case of 5 agents, and find a tight bound for the PCD strategyproof mechanism, which selects the reported location of an agent in proportion to the length…
This paper investigates mechanism design for congested facility location problems, where agents are partitioned into groups with conflicting interests (e.g., competition for booking a basketball court in a gymnasium), and each agent's cost…
We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…
We study mechanisms for candidate selection that seek to minimize the social cost, where voters and candidates are associated with points in some underlying metric space. The social cost of a candidate is the sum of its distances to each…
This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knapsack constraint. The items, however, are controlled by…
It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…