Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey
Abstract
The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering. At a high level, the goal is to design mechanisms to select a set of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective and ensure desirable properties based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information such as their locations. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2106.03457,
title = {Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey},
author = {Hau Chan and Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Bo Li and Minming Li and Chenhao Wang},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2106.03457},
year = {2021}
}
Comments
To appear in IJCAI 2021 (Survey Track)