Mechanism Design With Predictions for Obnoxious Facility Location
Computer Science and Game Theory
2025-07-17 v1 Artificial Intelligence
Multiagent Systems
Abstract
We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness and consistency on segments, squares, circles and trees. All these mechanisms are actually group strategyproof, with the exception of the case of squares, where manipulations from coalitions of two agents exist. We prove that these tradeoffs are optimal in the 1-dimensional case.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2212.09521,
title = {Mechanism Design With Predictions for Obnoxious Facility Location},
author = {Gabriel Istrate and Cosmin Bonchis},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2212.09521},
year = {2025}
}