Related papers: Truthful Facility Location with Candidate Location…
In this paper, we study mechanism design for single-facility location games where each agent has multiple private locations in [0, 1]. The individual objective is a satisfaction function that measures the discrepancy between the optimal…
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the…
We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility…
In this work we introduce an alternative model for the design and analysis of strategyproof mechanisms that is motivated by the recent surge of work in "learning-augmented algorithms". Aiming to complement the traditional approach in…
We study mechanism design problems in the {\em ordinal setting} wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents…
We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness and consistency on segments, squares, circles and trees. All…
In a facility game one or more facilities are placed in a metric space to serve a set of selfish agents whose addresses are their private information. In a classical facility game, each agent wants to be as close to a facility as possible,…
We propose a truthful-in-expectation, $(1-1/e)$-approximation mechanism for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP). In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a set of bins without exceeding the capacity…
This article describes a model and an exact solution method for facility location problems with decision-dependent uncertainties. The model allows characterizing the probability distribution of the random elements as a function of the…
We consider the problem of locating a single facility for 2 agents in $L_p$ space ($1<p<\infty$) and give a nearly complete characterization of such deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. We use the distance between an agent and the…
We consider the facility location problem in two dimensions. In particular, we consider a setting where agents have Euclidean preferences, defined by their ideal points, for a facility to be located in $\mathbb{R}^2$. We show that for the…
In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size $k$ among a group of $n$ is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of…
Facility location is fundamental in operations research, mechanism design, and algorithmic game theory, with applications ranging from urban infrastructure planning to distributed systems. Recent research in this area has focused on…
We present and discuss general techniques for proving inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms. We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems. In…
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…
This paper is devoted to the two-opposite-facility location games with a penalty whose amount depends on the distance between the two facilities to be opened by an authority. The two facilities are "opposite" in that one is popular and the…
We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard $z$ agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some agents exhibit extreme or atypical preferences. As a natural…
We study a variation of facility location problems (FLPs) that aims to improve the accessibility of agents to the facility within the context of mechanism design without money. In such a variation, agents have preferences on the ideal…