Related papers: Practical approach to $2$-Euclidean Preferences
We study single-candidate voting embedded in a metric space, where both voters and candidates are points in the space, and the distances between voters and candidates specify the voters' preferences over candidates. In the voting, each…
We study strategic candidate positioning in multidimensional spatial-voting elections. Voters and candidates are represented as points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, and each voter supports the candidate that is closest under a distance induced by an…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
[HHM20] discovered, for 7 pairs (C,D) of seemingly distinct standard electoral control types, that C and D are identical: For each input I and each election system, I is a Yes instance of both C and D, or of neither. Surprisingly this had…
We present an extension-based approach for computing and verifying preferences in an abstract argumentation system. Although numerous argumentation semantics have been developed previously for identifying acceptable sets of arguments from…
For multidimensional Euclidean type spaces, we study convex choice: from any choice set, the set of types that make the same choice is convex. We establish that, in a suitable sense, this property characterizes the sufficiency of local…
Lu and Boutilier proposed a novel approach based on "minimax regret" to use classical score based voting rules in the setting where preferences can be any partial (instead of complete) orders over the set of alternatives. We show here that…
We study the performance of voting mechanisms from a utilitarian standpoint, under the recently introduced framework of metric-distortion, offering new insights along three main lines. First, if $d$ represents the doubling dimension of the…
Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has received little attention here so far. In this setting, the agents…
Bribery in election (or computational social choice in general) is an important problem that has received a considerable amount of attention. In the classic bribery problem, the briber (or attacker) bribes some voters in attempting to make…
Shortlisting of candidates--selecting a group of "best" candidates--is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps…
It is challenging to quantify numerical preferences for different objectives in a multi-objective decision-making problem. However, the demonstrations of a user are often accessible. We propose an algorithm to infer linear preference…
In an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates, a Condorcet winning set is a committee of $k$ candidates such that for any outside candidate, a majority of voters prefer some committee member. Condorcet's paradox shows that some…
Aggregating agent preferences into a collective decision is an important step in many problems (e.g., hiring, elections, peer review) and across areas of computer science (e.g., reinforcement learning, recommender systems). As Social Choice…
We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…
We investigate the practical aspects of computing the necessary and possible winners in elections over incomplete voter preferences. In the case of the necessary winners, we show how to implement and accelerate the polynomial-time algorithm…
We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules--SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin--Courant, and HarmonicBorda--for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three…
Suppose that we wish to estimate a user's preference vector $w$ from paired comparisons of the form "does user $w$ prefer item $p$ or item $q$?," where both the user and items are embedded in a low-dimensional Euclidean space with distances…
We describe an approach for compiling preferences into logic programs under the answer set semantics. An ordered logic program is an extended logic program in which rules are named by unique terms, and in which preferences among rules are…
Modern AI is opening the door to collective decision-making in which participants express their views as free-form text rather than voting on a fixed set of candidates. A natural idea is to embed these opinions in a vector space so that the…