Convex Choice
Theoretical Economics
2024-06-28 v1
Abstract
For multidimensional Euclidean type spaces, we study convex choice: from any choice set, the set of types that make the same choice is convex. We establish that, in a suitable sense, this property characterizes the sufficiency of local incentive constraints. Convex choice is also of interest more broadly. We tie convex choice to a notion of directional single-crossing differences (DSCD). For an expected-utility agent choosing among lotteries, DSCD implies that preferences are either one-dimensional or must take the affine form that has been tractable in multidimensional mechanism design.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2406.19063,
title = {Convex Choice},
author = {Navin Kartik and Andreas Kleiner},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.19063},
year = {2024}
}