Related papers: Efficient Lower Bounding of Single Transferable Vo…

Every representative democracy must specify a mechanism under which voters choose their representatives. The most common mechanism in the United States -- Winner takes all single-member districts -- both enables substantial partisan…

We introduce the notion of {\em Distance Restricted Manipulation}, where colluding manipulator(s) need to compute if there exist votes which make their preferred alternative win the election when their knowledge about the others' votes is a…

Instant-runoff voting (IRV) is used in several countries around the world. It requires voters to rank candidates in order of preference, and uses a counting algorithm that is more complex than systems such as first-past-the-post or scoring…

We study metric distortion in distributed voting, where $n$ voters are partitioned into $k$ groups, each selecting a local representative, and a final winner is chosen from these representatives (or from the entire set of candidates). This…

Instant runoff voting (IRV) is an increasingly-popular alternative to traditional plurality voting in which voters submit rankings over the candidates rather than single votes. In practice, elections using IRV often restrict the ballot…

Instant-runoff voting (IRV) is often used when voters rank candidates rather than choosing only one favourite. We study IRV under graph-induced metric preferences where each vertex of an unweighted undirected graph hosts one voter and is…

A boardroom election is an election that takes place in a single room -- the boardroom -- in which all voters can see and hear each other. We present an initial exploration of boardroom elections with ballot privacy and voter verifiability…

Tournament solutions are standard tools for identifying winners based on pairwise comparisons between competing alternatives. The recently studied notion of margin of victory (MoV) offers a general method for refining the winner set of any…

In this paper we establish a new margin-based generalization bound for voting classifiers, refining existing results and yielding tighter generalization guarantees for widely used boosting algorithms such as AdaBoost (Freund and Schapire,…

Studying the computational complexity and designing fast algorithms for determining winners under voting rules are classical and fundamental questions in computational social choice. In this paper, we accelerate voting by leveraging quantum…

Multiwinner voting rules are used to select a small representative subset of candidates or items from a larger set given the preferences of voters. However, if candidates have sensitive attributes such as gender or ethnicity (when selecting…

Elections, the cornerstone of democratic societies, are usually regarded as unpredictable due to the complex interactions that shape them at different levels. In this work, we show that voter turnouts contain crucial information that can be…

One way of evaluating social choice (voting) rules is through a utilitarian distortion framework. In this model, we assume that agents submit full rankings over the alternatives, and these rankings are generated from underlying, but…

We investigate how robust the results of committee elections are to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates…

In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. Most parliaments are assembled using apportionment methods that distribute the seats based on the parties' vote counts. Common apportionment methods…

Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are among the most fundamental tools for binary classification. In its simplest formulation, an SVM produces a hyperplane separating two classes of data using the largest possible margin to the data. The focus…

A boardroom election is an election with a small number of voters carried out with public communications. We present BVOT, a self-tallying boardroom voting protocol with ballot secrecy, fairness (no tally information is available before the…

Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on…

Majority voting is one of the few black-box interventions that can improve a fixed stochastic predictor: repeated access can be cheaper than changing a high-capability model. Classical fixed-competence theory makes this intervention look…

We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head…