Related papers: Condorcet-Consistent Choice Among Three Candidates
We generalize Condorcet's jury theorem (CJT) to socially connected populations in which agents revise discrete choices on a network in the presence of zealots. Free agents receive privately informative signals about the correct alternative…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of $m$ alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characterization of strategyproof SDSs by Gibbard implies that there…
We study the effect of strategic behavior in iterative voting for multiple issues under uncertainty. We introduce a model synthesizing simultaneous multi-issue voting with Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein (2014)'s local dominance theory and…
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities…
To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings,…
Metric distortion in social choice is a framework for evaluating how well voting rules minimize social cost when both voters and candidates exist in a shared metric space, with a voter's cost defined by their distance to a candidate. Voters…
This paper introduces Propose or Vote (PoV), a democratic procedure for collective decision-making and elections that does not rely on a central mechanism designer. In the first stage, members of a polity choose whether to become…
Facing an unknown situation, a person may not be able to firmly elicit his/her preferences over different alternatives, so he/she tends to express uncertain preferences. Given a community of different persons expressing their preferences…
Condorcet domains are fundamental objects in the theory of majority voting; they are sets of linear orders with the property that if every voter picks a linear order from this set, assuming that the number of voters is odd, and alternatives…
We study proportional representation in the framework of temporal voting with approval ballots. Prior work adapted basic proportional representation concepts -- justified representation (JR), proportional JR (PJR), and extended JR (EJR) --…
We investigate opinion dynamics in multi-agent networks when a bias toward one of two possible opinions exists; for example, reflecting a status quo vs a superior alternative. Starting with all agents sharing an initial opinion representing…
We evaluate the tendency for different voting methods to promote political compromise and reduce tensions in a society by using computer simulations to determine which voters candidates are incentivized to appeal to. We find that Instant…
Elections play a fundamental role in democratic societies, however they are often characterized by unexpected results. Here we discuss an election campaign model inspired by the compartmental epidemiology, and we show that the model…
We focus on a generalization of the classic Minisum approval voting rule, introduced by Barrot and Lang (2016), and referred to as Conditional Minisum (CMS), for multi-issue elections with preferential dependencies. Under this rule, voters…
In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not to do so. I then show that under the…
We study how electoral rules shape polarization dynamics when voters and candidates both adapt to repeated election outcomes. We introduce two geometric primitives for comparing rules under this feedback: the \emph{winner radius} $R_t =…
We extend the recently introduced framework of metric distortion to multiwinner voting. In this framework, $n$ agents and $m$ alternatives are located in an underlying metric space. The exact distances between agents and alternatives are…
Election rules are formal processes that aggregate voters preferences, typically to select a single candidate, called the winner. Most of the election rules studied in the literature require the voters to rank the candidates from the most…
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
Arrow's celebrated Impossibility Theorem asserts that an election rule, or Social Welfare Function (SWF), between three or more candidates meeting a set of strict criteria cannot exist. Maskin suggests that Arrow's conditions for SWFs are…