Related papers: Condorcet-Consistent Choice Among Three Candidates
The August 2022 Alaska Special Election for US House contained many interesting features from the perspective of social choice theory. This election used instant runoff voting (often referred to as ranked choice voting) to elect a winner,…
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful, and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting…
In the well-studied metric distortion problem in social choice, we have voters and candidates located in a shared metric space, and the objective is to design a voting rule that selects a candidate with minimal total distance to the voters.…
Pull voting is a classic method to reach consensus among $n$ vertices with differing opinions in a distributed network: each vertex at each step takes on the opinion of a random neighbour. This method, however, suffers from two drawbacks.…
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…
We identify a new type of paradoxical behavior in dice, where the sum of independent rolls produces a deceptive sequence of dominance relations. We call these ``anti-inductive dice". Consider a game with two players and two non-identical…
We prove the three candidate Plurality is Stablest Conjecture of Khot-Kindler-Mossel-O'Donnell from 2005 for correlations $\rho$ satisfying $-1/43<\rho<1/10$: the Plurality function is the most noise stable three candidate election method…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
In this paper, we study the distortion bounds for voting mechanisms in multi-winner elections in general metric spaces. Our study pertains to the case in which each voter only reports her favorite candidate amongst $m$ possible choices.…
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from…
In this paper, we study the metric distortion of deterministic social choice rules that choose a winning candidate from a set of candidates based on voter preferences. Voters and candidates are located in an underlying metric space. A voter…
We consider the manipulability of tournament rules, in which $n$ teams play a round robin tournament and a winner is (possibly randomly) selected based on the outcome of all $\binom{n}{2}$ matches. Prior work defines a tournament rule to be…
We introduce a general problem about bribery in voting systems. In the $\mathcal{R}$-Multi-Bribery problem, the goal is to bribe a set of voters at minimum cost such that a desired candidate wins the perturbed election under the voting rule…
In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from…
An important question in elections is the determine whether a candidate can be a winner when some votes are absent. We study this determining winner with the absent votes (WAV) problem when the votes are top-truncated. We show that the WAV…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over…
In this paper, we study voting rules on the interval domain, where the alternatives are arranged according to an externally given strict total order and voters report intervals of this order to indicate the alternatives they support. For…
A Ranked candidate voting method based on Phragmen's procedure is described that can be used to produce a top-down proportional candidate list. The method complies with the Droop proportionality criterion satisfied by Single Transferable…
By relaxing the dominating set in three ways (e.g., from "each member beats every non-member" to "each member beats or ties every non-member, with an additional requirement that at least one member beat every non-member"), we propose a new…
Consider an election between k candidates in which each voter votes randomly (but not necessarily independently) and suppose that there is a single candidate that every voter prefers (in the sense that each voter is more likely to vote for…