Related papers: Commitment and Randomization in Communication
A bit string commitment protocol securely commits $N$ classical bits in such a way that the recipient can extract only $M<N$ bits of information about the string. Classical reasoning might suggest that bit string commitment implies bit…
The game of best choice (or "secretary problem") is a model for making an irrevocable decision among a fixed number of candidate choices that are presented sequentially in random order, one at a time. Because the classically optimal…
We consider games played on finite graphs, whose goal is to obtain a trace belonging to a given set of winning traces. We focus on those states from which Player 1 cannot force a win. We explore and compare several criteria for establishing…
We undertake a formal study of the value of targeting data to an advertiser. As expected, this value is increasing in the utility difference between realizations of the targeting data and the accuracy of the data, and depends on the…
We initiate the study of fairness in reinforcement learning, where the actions of a learning algorithm may affect its environment and future rewards. Our fairness constraint requires that an algorithm never prefers one action over another…
We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an unknown state, so no sender can verify another's report. A…
We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in…
The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered…
A simple derivation of the optimal state estimation of a quantum bit was obtained by using the no-signaling principle. In particular, the no-signaling principle determines a unique form of the guessing probability independently of figures…
Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…
Motivated by cost of computation in game theory, we explore how changing the utilities of players (changing their complexity costs) affects the outcome of a game. We show that even if we improve a player's utility in every action profile,…
I defend an analog of probabilism that characterizes rationally coherent estimates for chances. Specifically, I demonstrate the following accuracy-dominance result for stochastic theories in the C*-algebraic framework: supposing an…
We consider the problem of a particular kind of quantum correlation that arises in some two-party games. In these games, one player is presented with a question they must answer, yielding an outcome of either 'win' or 'lose'. Molina and…
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…
In this paper, we study the effect of preferential assistance on cooperation in the donation game. Cooperators provide benefits to their neighbors at some costs. Defectors pay no cost and do not distribute any benefits. The total…
The value maximization version of the secretary problem is the problem of hiring a candidate with the largest value from a randomly ordered sequence of candidates. In this work, we consider a setting where predictions of candidate values…
In this paper we provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily having transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is…
Bit commitment protocols whose security is based on the laws of quantum mechanics alone are generally held to be impossible. In this paper we give a strengthened and explicit proof of this result. We extend its scope to a much larger…
I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her…
A principal and an agent can launch a project under unanimous consent. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an underlying state, and the agent privately knows his own preference. The principal can conduct a test to learn…