Related papers: Commitment and Randomization in Communication
This study examines whether unobserved factors substantially bias education evaluations that rely on the Conditional Independence Assumption. We add 14 new within-study comparisons to the literature, all from primary schools in England.…
We propose a stochastic model of opinion exchange in networks. A finite set of agents is organized in a fixed network structure. There is a binary state of the world and each agent receives a private signal on the state. We model beliefs as…
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared with the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance, we provide…
We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items to agents that have arbitrary entitlements to the items. Every agent $i$ has a valuation function $v_i$ and an entitlement $b_i$, where entitlements sum up to~1. Which…
In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…
How can we assess the reliability of a dataset without access to ground truth? We introduce the problem of reliability scoring for datasets collected from potentially strategic sources. The true data are unobserved, but we see outcomes of…
This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver's…
We all have preferences when multiple choices are available. If we insist on satisfying our preferences only, we may suffer a loss due to conflicts with other people's identical selections. Such a case applies when the choice cannot be…
The well-worn George Box aphorism ``all models are wrong, but some are useful'' is particularly salient in the cybersecurity domain, where the assumptions built into a model can have substantial financial or even national security impacts.…
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…
Knowing when a classifier's prediction can be trusted is useful in many applications and critical for safely using AI. While the bulk of the effort in machine learning research has been towards improving classifier performance,…
As AI systems increasingly take on instructional roles - providing feedback, guiding practice, evaluating work - a fundamental question emerges: does it matter to learners who they believe is on the other side? We investigated this using a…
We propose a consensus opinion model based on the evolutionary game. In our model, both of the two connected agents receive a benefit if they have the same opinion, otherwise they both pay a cost. Agents update their opinions by comparing…
Our paper studies the setting of players using no-regret algorithms in various two-player games. We address whether having stronger regret guarantees or playing against an opponent with weaker regret guarantees yields higher utilities for…
Can players sustain long-run trust when their equilibrium beliefs are shaped by machine-learning methods that penalize complexity? I study a game in which an infinite sequence of agents with one-period recall decides whether to place trust…
We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…
We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to…
We address Bayesian persuasion between a sender and a receiver with state-dependent quadratic cost measures for general classes of distributions. The receiver seeks to make mean-square-error estimate of a state based on a signal sent by the…
A new commitment scheme based on position-verification and non-local quantum correlations is presented here for the first time in literature. The only credential for unconditional security is the position of committer and non-local…