Related papers: Packing a Knapsack with Items Owned by Strategic A…
We consider the problem of locating a single facility for 2 agents in $L_p$ space ($1<p<\infty$) and give a nearly complete characterization of such deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. We use the distance between an agent and the…
Aiming to overcome some of the limitations of worst-case analysis, the recently proposed framework of "algorithms with predictions" allows algorithms to be augmented with a (possibly erroneous) machine-learned prediction that they can use…
In dynamic programming and reinforcement learning, the policy for the sequential decision making of an agent in a stochastic environment is usually determined by expressing the goal as a scalar reward function and seeking a policy that…
In the stochastic knapsack problem, we are given a knapsack of size B, and a set of jobs whose sizes and rewards are drawn from a known probability distribution. However, we know the actual size and reward only when the job completes. How…
The design of online algorithms has tended to focus on algorithms with worst-case guarantees, e.g., bounds on the competitive ratio. However, it is well-known that such algorithms are often overly pessimistic, performing sub-optimally on…
We consider the Bilevel Knapsack with Interdiction Constraints, an extension of the classic 0-1 knapsack problem formulated as a Stackelberg game with two agents, a leader and a follower, that choose items from a common set and hold their…
We study the three-dimensional Knapsack (3DK) problem, in which we are given a set of axis-aligned cuboids with associated profits and an axis-aligned cube knapsack. The objective is to find a non-overlapping axis-aligned packing (by…
While autonomous agents often surpass humans in their ability to handle vast and complex data, their potential misalignment (i.e., lack of transparency regarding their true objective) has thus far hindered their use in critical applications…
In the knapsack problems with neighborhood constraints that were studied before, the input is a graph $\mathcal{G}$ on a set $\mathcal{V}$ of items, each item $v \in \mathcal{V}$ has a weight $w_v$ and profit $p_v$, the size $s$ of the…
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is robust against…
We consider a facility location game in which $n$ agents reside at known locations on a path, and $k$ heterogeneous facilities are to be constructed on the path. Each agent is adversely affected by some subset of the facilities, and is…
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…
We consider budget feasible mechanisms for procurement auctions with additive valuation functions. For the divisible case, where agents can be allocated fractionally, there exists an optimal mechanism with approximation guarantee $e/(e-1)$…
We study the problem of finding a small subset of items that is \emph{agreeable} to all agents, meaning that all agents value the subset at least as much as its complement. Previous work has shown worst-case bounds, over all instances with…
We consider a variant of the knapsack problem, where items are available with different possible weights. Using a separate budget for these item improvements, the question is: Which items should be improved to which degree such that the…
We study a general allocation setting where agent valuations are concave additive. In this model, a collection of items must be uniquely distributed among a set of agents, where each agent-item pair has a specified utility. The objective is…
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in buying goods or services from a group of strategic…
Consider a barter exchange problem over a finite set of agents, where each agent owns an item and is also associated with a (privately known) wish list of items belonging to the other agents. An outcome of the problem is a (re)allocation of…
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms…
In this paper, we consider the classic stochastic (dynamic) knapsack problem, a fundamental mathematical model in revenue management, with general time-varying random demand. Our main goal is to study the optimal policies, which can be…