Related papers: Packing a Knapsack with Items Owned by Strategic A…
We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to…
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in…
We study a natural geometric variant of the classic Knapsack problem called 2D-Knapsack: we are given a set of axis-parallel rectangles and a rectangular bounding box, and the goal is to pack as many of these rectangles inside the box…
A variant of the online knapsack problem is considered in the settings of trusted and untrusted predictions. In Unit Profit Knapsack, the items have unit profit, and it is easy to find an optimal solution offline: Pack as many of the…
Facility location is fundamental in operations research, mechanism design, and algorithmic game theory, with applications ranging from urban infrastructure planning to distributed systems. Recent research in this area has focused on…
Optimal stopping is the problem of determining when to stop a stochastic system in order to maximize reward, which is of practical importance in domains such as finance, operations management and healthcare. Existing methods for…
This paper investigates a stochastic inventory management problem in which a cash-constrained small retailer periodically purchases a product from suppliers and sells it to a market while facing non-stationary demands. In each period, the…
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK…
It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…
In the strategic facility location problem, a set of agents report their locations in a metric space and the goal is to use these reports to open a new facility, minimizing an aggregate distance measure from the agents to the facility.…
Probabilistic control design is founded on the principle that a rational agent attempts to match modelled with an arbitrary desired closed-loop system trajectory density. The framework was originally proposed as a tractable alternative to…
In this paper, we study the non-monotone adaptive submodular maximization problem subject to a knapsack and a $k$-system constraints. The input of our problem is a set of items, where each item has a particular state drawn from a known…
Submodular maximization has been a central topic in theoretical computer science and combinatorial optimization over the last decades. Plenty of well-performed approximation algorithms have been designed for the problem over a variety of…
Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of the agents, the axiom of impartiality requires that the…
Obtaining strong linear relaxations of capacitated covering problems constitute a major technical challenge even for simple settings. For one of the most basic cases, the Knapsack-Cover (Min-Knapsack) problem, the relaxation based on…
In this paper, we investigate the parametric weight knapsack problem, in which the item weights are affine functions of the form $w_i(\lambda) = a_i + \lambda \cdot b_i$ for $i \in \{1,\ldots,n\}$ depending on a real-valued parameter…
The min-knapsack problem with compactness constraints extends the classical knapsack problem, in the case of ordered items, by introducing a restriction ensuring that they cannot be too far apart. This problem has applications in…
A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms guarantee that it is "obvious" for these imperfectly rational…
In resource allocation, we often require that the output allocation of an algorithm is stable against input perturbation because frequent reallocation is costly and untrustworthy. Varma and Yoshida (SODA'21) formalized this requirement for…