Related papers: Computing Ex Ante Equilibrium in Heterogeneous Zer…

Unlike normal-form games, where correlated equilibria have been studied for more than 45 years, extensive-form correlation is still generally not well understood. Part of the reason for this gap is that the sequential nature of…

We present novel techniques for neuro-symbolic concurrent stochastic games, a recently proposed modelling formalism to represent a set of probabilistic agents operating in a continuous-space environment using a combination of neural network…

Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…

This paper proposes a new lens for studying threshold games played on networks when the thresholds are heterogeneous. These are games where agents have two possible actions, and prefer action 1 if and only if enough of their neighbours…

We study the problem of computing optimal correlated equilibria (CEs) in infinite-horizon multi-player stochastic games, where correlation signals are provided over time. In this setting, optimal CEs require history-dependent policies; this…

We analyze the difference between ex ante and ex post equilibria in classical games played with the assistance of a nonlocal (quantum or no-signaling) resource. In physics, the playing of these games is known as performing bipartite…

While the topic of mean-field games (MFGs) has a relatively long history, heretofore there has been limited work concerning algorithms for the computation of equilibrium control policies. In this paper, we develop a computable policy…

Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…

Training multi-agent systems (MAS) to achieve realistic equilibria gives us a useful tool to understand and model real-world systems. We consider a general sum partially observable Markov game where agents of different types share a single…

This paper is concerned with a non-zero sum differential game problem of an anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential delayed equation under partial information. We establish a necessary maximum principle and sufficient…

We present a novel framework for {\epsilon}-optimally solving two-player zero-sum partially observable stochastic games (zs-POSGs). These games pose a major challenge due to the absence of a principled connection with dynamic programming…

We are concerned with a distributed approach to solve multi-cluster games arising in multi-agent systems. In such games, agents are separated into distinct clusters. The agents belonging to the same cluster cooperate with each other to…

Many security and other real-world situations are dynamic in nature and can be modelled as strictly competitive (or zero-sum) dynamic games. In these domains, agents perform actions to affect the environment and receive observations --…

In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…

We present a novel polynomial time approximation scheme for two-strategy anonymous games, in which the players' utility functions, although potentially different, do not differentiate among the identities of the other players. Our algorithm…

We study computationally efficient methods for finding equilibria in n-player general-sum games, specifically ones that afford complex visuomotor skills. We show how existing methods would struggle in this setting, either computationally or…

In this paper, we formulate a two-player zero-sum game under dynamic constraints defined by hybrid dynamical equations. The game consists of a min-max problem involving a cost functional that depends on the actions and resulting solutions…

Equilibrium finding in two-player zero-sum games with perfect recall is a well-studied topic that has led to many breakthroughs in computational game theory. This paper aims to generalize such techniques to (timeable) two-player zero-sum…

We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold'em Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable,…

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from…