Related papers: Verification with Common Knowledge of Rationality …
Rational verification is the problem of determining which temporal logic properties will hold in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents in the system act rationally, by choosing strategies that collectively form a…
Rational verification refers to the problem of checking which temporal logic properties hold of a concurrent multiagent system, under the assumption that agents in the system choose strategies that form a game-theoretic equilibrium.…
We study two natural problems about rational behaviors in multiplayer non-zero-sum sequential infinite duration games played on graphs: checking problems, that consist in deciding whether a strategy profile, defined by a Mealy machine, is…
In the context of multi-agent systems, the rational verification problem is concerned with checking which temporal logic properties will hold in a system when its constituent agents are assumed to behave rationally and strategically in…
In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…
There are two well-known sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in two-player games: mutual knowledge of rationality (MKR) and mutual knowledge of conjectures. MKR assumes that the concept of rationality is mutually known. In contrast,…
We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of \emph{knowledge-based programs}. Intuitively, all solution…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
Common knowledge/belief in rationality is the traditional standard assumption in analysing interaction among agents. This paper proposes a graph-based language for capturing significantly more complicated structures of higher-order beliefs…
This paper addresses complexity problems in rational verification and synthesis for multi-player games played on weighted graphs, where the objective of each player is to minimize the cost of reaching a specific set of target vertices. In…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Computing equilibria of games is a central task in computer science. A large number of results are known for \emph{Nash equilibrium} (NE). However, these can be adopted only when coalitions are not an issue. When instead agents can form…
Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…
We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL…
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…
When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…
We study the computational complexity of "public goods games on networks". In this model, each vertex in a graph is an agent that needs to take a binary decision of whether to "produce a good" or not. Each agent's utility depends on the…
Knowledge Representation (KR) is traditionally based on the logic of facts, expressed in boolean logic. However, facts about an agent can also be seen as a set of accomplished tasks by the agent. This paper proposes a new approach to KR:…
In this paper we investigate formal verification problems for Neural Network computations. Various reachability problems will be in the focus, such as: Given symbolic specifications of allowed inputs and outputs in form of Linear…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…