Rational Capability in Concurrent Games
Logic in Computer Science
2025-02-19 v1 Multiagent Systems
Abstract
We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL languages that extend the basic CL and ATL languages with modalities for rational capability, namely, a coalition's capability to rationally enforce a given property. For each of these languages, we provide results about the complexity of satisfiability checking and model checking as well as about axiomatization.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2502.12286,
title = {Rational Capability in Concurrent Games},
author = {Yinfeng Li and Emiliano Lorini and Munyque Mittelmann},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.12286},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
Extended version of the paper accepted at AAMAS 25