Related papers: Verification with Common Knowledge of Rationality …
Logics for reasoning about knowledge and actions have seen many applications in various domains of multi-agent systems, including epistemic planning. Change of knowledge based on observations about the surroundings forms a key aspect in…
We present a model of pragmatic language understanding, where utterances are produced and understood by searching for regularized equilibria of signaling games. In this model (which we call ReCo, for Regularized Conventions), speakers and…
Classical logics for strategic reasoning, such as Coalition Logic and Alternating-time Temporal Logic, formalize absolute strategic reasoning about the unconditional strategic abilities of agents to achieve their goals. Goranko and Ju, in…
Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The…
Agents trained by reinforcement learning (RL) often fail to generalize beyond the environment they were trained in, even when presented with new scenarios that seem similar to the training environment. We study the query complexity required…
We study the framework of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player 0 announces a strategy and Player 1 responds rationally with a strategy that is an optimal response. While it is usually assumed that Player 1 has a…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…
Reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms allow agents to learn skills and strategies to perform complex tasks without detailed instructions or expensive labelled training examples. That is, RL agents can learn, as we learn. Given the…
There has been significant recent interest in leader-follower security games, where the leader dominates the decision process with the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy. However, such a leader-follower scheme may become invalid in…
Knowledge representation and reasoning systems represent knowledge as collections of facts and rules. KRRs can represent complex concepts and relations, and they can query and manipulate information in sophisticated ways. Unfortunately, the…
Hyperproperties generalize traditional trace properties by relating multiple execution traces rather than reasoning about individual runs in isolation. They provide a unified way to express important requirements such as information flow…
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had…
Our ability to know when to trust the decisions made by machine learning systems has not kept up with the staggering improvements in their performance, limiting their applicability in high-stakes domains. We introduce Prover-Verifier Games…
In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by…
We take a game theoretical approach to determine necessary and sufficient conditions under which we can persuade rational agents to exchange messages in pairwise exchanges over links of a dynamic network, by holding them accountable for…
Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of…
We establish a classification of decision problems that are to be solved by mobile agents operating in unlabeled graphs, using a deterministic protocol. The classification is with respect to the ability of a team of agents to solve the…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…
Careful rational synthesis was defined in (Condurache et al. 2021) as a quantitative extension of Fisman et al.'s rational synthesis (Fisman et al. 2010), as a model of multi-agent systems in which agents are interacting in a graph arena in…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…