Related papers: Optimal In-Kind Redistribution
In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the…
The debate between the optimal way of allocating societal surplus (i.e. products and services) has been raging, in one form or another, practically forever; following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the market became the only…
We consider a mechanism design problem for energy procurement, when there is one buyer and one seller, and the buyer is the mechanism designer. The seller can generate energy from conventional (deterministic) and renewable (random) plants,…
We study an economic model where agents trade a variety of products by using one of three competing rules: "need", "greed" and "noise". We find that the optimal strategy for any agent depends on both product composition in the overall…
Social media influencers account for a growing share of marketing worldwide. We demonstrate the existence of a novel form of market failure in this advertising market: influencer cartels, where groups of influencers collude to increase…
We introduce a highly stylized, yet non trivial model of the economy, with a public and private sector coupled through a wealth tax and a redistribution policy. The model can be fully solved analytically, and allows one to address the…
When a company undergoes a merger or transfers its ownership, the existing governing body has an opinion on which buyer should take over as the new owner. Similar situations occur while assigning the host of big sports tournaments, like the…
In this paper, we consider the problem of fair division of indivisible goods when the allocation of goods impacts society. Specifically, we introduce a second valuation function for each agent, determining the social impact of allocating a…
We compare two competing methodologies of market zones identification under the criterion of social welfare maximization: (i) consensus clustering of Locational Marginal Prices over different wind scenarios and (ii) congestion contribution…
Current methodologies in machine learning analyze the effects of various statistical parity notions of fairness primarily in light of their impacts on predictive accuracy and vendor utility loss. In this paper, we propose a new framework…
Herding, where investors imitate others' decisions rather than relying on their own analysis, is a prevalent phenomenon in financial markets. Excessive herding distorts rational decisions, amplifies volatility, and can be exploited by…
When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two…
Sequential allocation is a simple and attractive mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods. Agents take turns, according to a policy, to pick items. Sequential allocation is guaranteed to return an allocation which is efficient but…
We consider optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer's valuations towards the two items are independent and additive. In this setting, optimal mechanism is unknown for general valuation distributions. We…
A central challenge in using price signals to coordinate the electricity consumption of a group of users is the operator's lack of knowledge of the users due to privacy concerns. In this paper, we develop a two-time-scale incentive…
Consider a coordination game played on a network, where agents prefer taking actions closer to those of their neighbors and to their own ideal points in action space. We explore how the welfare outcomes of a coordination game depend on…
Dynamic pricing schemes were introduced as an alternative to posted-price mechanisms. In contrast to static models, the dynamic setting allows to update the prices between buyer-arrivals based on the remaining sets of items and buyers, and…
Diffusion auction design is a new trend in mechanism design for which the main goal is to incentivize existing buyers to invite new buyers, who are their neighbors on a social network, to join an auction even though they are competitors.…
This paper introduces a new algorithmic execution model that integrates interbank limit and market orders with internal liquidity generated through market making. Based on the Cartea et al.\cite{cartea2015algorithmic} framework, we…
Reducing the peak energy consumption of households is essential for the effective use of renewable energy sources, in order to ensure that as much household demand as possible can be met by renewable sources. This entails spreading out the…