Related papers: Optimal In-Kind Redistribution
Influence maximization is the problem of finding a set of influential users in a social network such that the expected spread of influence under a certain propagation model is maximized. Much of the previous work has neglected the important…
This paper studies algorithmic decision-making in the presence of strategic individual behaviors, where an ML model is used to make decisions about human agents and the latter can adapt their behavior strategically to improve their future…
Almost every public pension system shares two attributes: earning deductions to finance benefits, and benefits that depend on earnings. This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically the trade-off between social insurance and incentive…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling a public good to a group of agents by a principal in the correlated private value environment. We assume the principal only knows the expectations of the agents' values, but does not know the…
An agent with an inaccurate model of its environment faces a difficult choice: it can ignore the errors in its model and act in the real world in whatever way it determines is optimal with respect to its model. Alternatively, it can take a…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
Econophysics provides a strategy for understanding the potential mechanisms underlying the anomalous distribution of wealth found in real societies. We present a computational nonlinear stochastic model for the distribution of wealth that…
Personalized pricing is a business strategy to charge different prices to individual consumers based on their characteristics and behaviors. It has become common practice in many industries nowadays due to the availability of a growing…
We study the problem of finding the optimal assortment that maximizes expected revenue under the decision forest model, a recently proposed nonparametric choice model that is capable of representing any discrete choice model and in…
Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…
Resource distribution is a fundamental problem in economic and policy design, particularly when demand and supply are not naturally aligned. Without regulation, wealthier individuals may monopolize this resource, leaving the needs of others…
We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each good comes in…
How should a buyer design procurement mechanisms when suppliers' costs are unknown, and the buyer does not have a prior belief? We demonstrate that simple mechanisms - that share a constant fraction of the buyer utility with the seller -…
Welfare maximization in bilateral trade has been extensively studied in recent years. Previous literature obtained incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms only for the private values case. In this paper, we study welfare maximization…
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…
We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…
We study optimal bundling when consumers differ in one dimension. We introduce a partial order on the set of bundles defined by (i) set inclusion and (ii) sales volumes (if sold alone and priced optimally). We show that if the undominated…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
Online markets are a part of everyday life, and their rules are governed by algorithms. Assuming participants are inherently self-interested, well designed rules can help to increase social welfare. Many algorithms for online markets are…
A favorable population schedule for the entire potential human family is sought, under the overlapping generations framework, by treating population (or fertility) as a planning variable in a dynamical social welfare maximization context.…