Related papers: Optimal In-Kind Redistribution
Online bidding serves as a fundamental information system in mobile ecosystems, facilitating real-time ad allocation across billions of devices while optimizing both platform performance and user experience through data-driven decision…
We study revenue maximization by deterministic mechanisms for the simplest case for which Myerson's characterization does not hold: a single seller selling two items, with independently distributed values, to a single additive buyer. We…
We study the problem of a principal who wants to influence an agent's observable action, subject to an ex-post budget. The agent has a private type determining their cost function. This paper endogenizes the value of the resource driving…
We study the fair division problem of allocating multiple resources among a set of agents with Leontief preferences that are each required to complete a finite amount of work, which we term "limited demands". We examine the behavior of the…
In this research, we study the problem that a collector acquires items from the owner based on the item qualities the owner declares and an independent appraiser's assessments. The owner is interested in maximizing the probability that the…
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…
We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs: a) direct incentives to…
The quest on how to collectively self-organize in order to maximize the survival chances of the members of a social group requires finding an optimal compromise between maximizing the well-being of an individual and that of the group. Here…
The performance of an energy system under a real-time pricing mechanism depends on the consumption behavior of its customers, which involves uncertainties. In this paper, we consider a system operator that charges its customers with a…
We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering…
We consider the problem of helping agents improve by setting short-term goals. Given a set of target skill levels, we assume each agent will try to improve from their initial skill level to the closest target level within reach or do…
In this work, we propose an axiomatic approach for measuring the performance/welfare of a system consisting of concurrent agents in a resource-driven system. Our approach provides a unifying view on popular system optimality principles,…
We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical…
Given a graph $G$, a community structure $\mathcal{C}$, and a budget $k$, the fair influence maximization problem aims to select a seed set $S$ ($|S|\leq k$) that maximizes the influence spread while narrowing the influence gap between…
Cooperation underlies many aspects of the evolution of human and animal societies, where cooperators produce social goods to benefit others. Explaining the emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals has become a major research…
We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a…
We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution…
In this paper, we design gross product maximization mechanisms which incentivize users to upload high-quality contents on user-generated-content (UGC) websites. We show that, the proportional division mechanism, which is widely used in…
We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project problems. We aim to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected social welfare. For the nonexcludable public project model, we identify a…
In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. Our mechanism allocates the object to the highest valued agent…