Related papers: Individually Stable Dynamics in Coalition Formatio…
We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of…
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In…
Motivated by understanding non-strict and strict pure strategy equilibria in network anti-coordination games, we define notions of stable and, respectively, strictly stable colorings in graphs. We characterize the cases when such colorings…
Graph convolutional neural networks (GCNNs) have emerged as powerful tools for analyzing graph-structured data, achieving remarkable success across diverse applications. However, the theoretical understanding of the stability of these…
Persistent homology, a technique from computational topology, has recently shown strong empirical performance in the context of graph classification. Being able to capture long range graph properties via higher-order topological features,…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…
We consider a hypergraph (I,C), with possible multiple (hyper)edges and loops, in which the vertices $i\in I$ are interpreted as agents, and the edges $c\in C$ as contracts that can be concluded between agents. The preferences of each agent…
Score-based approaches in the structure learning task are thriving because of their scalability. Continuous relaxation has been the key reason for this advancement. Despite achieving promising outcomes, most of these methods are still…
How do networks of relationships evolve over time? We analyse a dataset tracking the social interactions of 900 individuals over four years. Despite continuous shifts in individual relationships, the macroscopic structural properties of the…
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a biological population affects which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations is difficult. Precise results have been…
We establish a network formation game for the Internet's Autonomous System (AS) interconnection topology. The game includes different types of players, accounting for the heterogeneity of ASs in the Internet. We incorporate reliability…
A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
Competing bimodal coalitions among a group of actors are discussed. First, a model from political sciences is revisited. Most of the model statements are found not to be contained in the model. Second, a new coalition model is built. It…
We construct a model of strategic imitation in an arbitrary network of players who interact through an additive game. Assuming a discrete time update, we show a condition under which the resulting difference equations converge to consensus.…
We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population matching settings, respectively. Players choose strategies to maximize their subjective…
We consider the dynamics, existence and stability of the equilibrium states for large populations of individuals who can play various types of non--cooperative games. The players imitate the most attractive strategies, and the choice is…
The quest for optimal/stable paths in graphs has gained attention in a few practical or theoretical areas. To take part in this quest this chapter adopts an equilibrium-oriented approach that is abstract and general: it works with…
We consider games played on finite graphs, whose goal is to obtain a trace belonging to a given set of winning traces. We focus on those states from which Player 1 cannot force a win. We explore and compare several criteria for establishing…
We consider coalition formation games in which each player has preferences over the other players and his preferences over coalitions are based on the best player ($\mathcal{B}$-/B-hedonic games) or the worst player ($\mathcal{W}$/W-hedonic…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…