Related papers: Individually Stable Dynamics in Coalition Formatio…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
Here we introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the…
In coalition formation games self-organized coalitions are created as a result of the strategic interactions of independent agents. For each couple of agents $(i,j)$, weight $w_{i,j}=w_{j,i}$ reflects how much agents $i$ and $j$ benefit…
Cooperation plays a fundamental role in societal and biological domains, and the population structure profoundly shapes the dynamics of evolution. Practically, individuals behave either altruistically or egoistically in multiple groups,…
We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player --- who is associated with a subset of vertices --- matches as many of…
In evolutionary game theory, repeated two-player games are used to study strategy evolution in a population under natural selection. As the evolution greatly depends on the interaction structure, there has been growing interests in studying…
This paper formulates a multitask optimization problem where agents in the network have individual objectives to meet, or individual parameter vectors to estimate, subject to a smoothness condition over the graph. The smoothness condition…
Data with geometric structure is ubiquitous in machine learning often arising from fundamental symmetries in a domain, such as permutation-invariance in graphs and translation-invariance in images. Group-convolutional architectures, which…
In this work we study the behavior of classical two-person, two-strategies evolutionary games on networks embedded in a Euclidean two-dimensional space with different kinds of degree distributions and topologies going from regular to…
A graph is subcubic if it is connected and its maximum vertex degree does not exceed 3. Two disjoint vertex subsets of a graph $G$ form a connected coalition in $G$ if neither of them is a connected dominating set but their union is a…
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that…
Networks such as organizational network of a global company play an important role in a variety of knowledge management and information diffusion tasks. The nodes in these networks correspond to individuals who are self-interested. The…
Competition and cooperation are inherent features of any multi-echelon supply chain. The interactions among the agents across the same echelon and that across various echelons influence the percolation of market demand across echelons. The…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
While actors in a population can interact with anyone else freely, social relations significantly influence our inclination towards particular individuals. The consequence of such interactions, however, may also form the intensity of our…
Motivated by the controller placement problems in software-defined networks and the fair division principles of classical "cake cutting", we investigate the following two-player zero-sum game. In our model, a defender places a limited…
Most of previous studies concerning the Public Goods Game assume either participation is unconditional or the number of actual participants in a competitive group changes over time. How the fixed group size, prescribed by social…
We study relationships between different relaxed notions of core stability in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. Our unified approach applies to a newly introduced family of hedonic games, called $\alpha$-hedonic…
Hedonic games formalize coalition formation scenarios where players evaluate an outcome based on the coalition they are contained in. Due to a large number of possible coalitions, compact representations of these games are crucial. We…