Related papers: Individually Stable Dynamics in Coalition Formatio…
Decision makers are often confronted with complex tasks which cannot be solved by an individual alone, but require collaboration in the form of a coalition. Previous literature argues that instability, in terms of the re-organization of a…
In structured populations the spatial arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the interaction graph together with the structure of the graph itself determines the game dynamics and particularly whether or not fixation of cooperation (or…
The optimal value computation for turned-based stochastic games with reachability objectives, also known as simple stochastic games, is one of the few problems in $NP \cap coNP$ which are not known to be in $P$. However, there are some…
The relationship between topology and dynamics of complex systems has motivated continuing interest from the scientific community. In the present work, we address this interesting topic from the perspective of simple games, involving two…
We analyze a network formation game in a strategic setting where payoffs of individuals depend only on their immediate neighbourhood. We call these payoffs as localized payoffs. In this game, the payoff of each individual captures (1) the…
We consider ordinary differential equations on the unit simplex of $\RR^n$ that naturally occur in population games, models of learning and self reinforced random processes. Generalizing and relying on an idea introduced in \cite{DF11}, we…
As a first step toward realizing a dynamical system that evolves while spontaneously determining its own rule for time evolution, function dynamics (FD) is analyzed. FD consists of a functional equation with a self-referential term, given…
We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by…
This paper analyses the stability of cycles within a heteroclinic network lying in a three-dimensional manifold formed by six cycles, for a one-parameter model developed in the context of game theory. We show the asymptotic stability of the…
Whether or not cooperation is favored over defection in evolutionary games can be assigned by structure coefficients for any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on any network modeled as a regular graph. We study how these structure…
Additively Separable Hedonic Game (ASHG) are coalition-formation games where we are given a graph whose vertices represent $n$ selfish agents and the weight of each edge $uv$ denotes how much agent $u$ gains (or loses) when she is placed in…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
This paper aims to provide insight into stability of collaboration choices in P2P networks. We study networks where exchanges between nodes are driven by the desire to receive the best service available. This is the case for most existing…
We study coalitional games with exogenous uncertainty in the coalition value, in which each agent is allowed to have private samples of the uncertainty. As a consequence, the agents may have a different perception of stability of the grand…
Consider a system in which players at nodes of an underlying graph G repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma against their neighbors. The players adapt their strategies based on the past behavior of their opponents by applying the so-called…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…
The existence of instabilities, for example in the form of adversarial examples, has given rise to a highly active area of research concerning itself with understanding and enhancing the stability of neural networks. We focus on a popular…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
In this work we present a strategic network formation model predicting the emergence of multigroup structures. Individuals decide to form or remove links based on the benefits and costs those connections carry; we focus on bilateral consent…
The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in…