Related papers: Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Abstention
We present an alternative voting system that aims at bridging the gap between proportional representative systems and majoritarian, single winner election systems. The system lets people vote for multiple parties, but then assigns each…
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
We consider a social choice problem where only a small number of people out of a large population are sufficiently available or motivated to vote. A common solution to increase participation is to allow voters use a proxy, that is, transfer…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free truth-telling is equivalent to strategy-proofness among…
The metric distortion framework posits that n voters and m candidates are jointly embedded in a metric space such that voters rank candidates that are closer to them higher. A voting rule's purpose is to pick a candidate with minimum total…
The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters' preferences. An important concern in this setting is representation: large groups of voters with cohesive preferences should be adequately represented…
Elections involving a very large voter population often lead to outcomes that surprise many. This is particularly important for the elections in which results affect the economy of a sizable population. A better prediction of the true…
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities…
In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not to do so. I then show that under the…
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that any constitution which satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity and is not a Dictator has to be non-transitive. In this paper we study quantitative versions of Arrow…
By relaxing the dominating set in three ways (e.g., from "each member beats every non-member" to "each member beats or ties every non-member, with an additional requirement that at least one member beat every non-member"), we propose a new…
The study of proportionality in multiwinner voting with approval ballots has received much attention in recent years. Typically, proportionality is captured by variants of the Justified Representation axiom, which say that cohesive groups…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random…
We experimentally study voter turnout in two-tier elections when the electorate consists of multiple groups, such as states. Votes are aggregated within the groups by the winner-take-all rule or the proportional rule, and the group-level…
Proportional representation (PR) is a fundamental principle of many democracies world-wide which employ PR-based voting rules to elect their representatives. The normative properties of these voting rules however, are often only understood…
In this paper we analyse some of the classical paradoxes in Social Choice Theory (namely, the Condorcet paradox, the discursive dilemma, the Ostrogorski paradox and the multiple election paradox) using a general framework for the study of…
Social Choice theory generalizes voting on one proposal to ranking multiple proposals. Yet, while a vote on a single proposal has the status quo (Reality) as a default, Reality has been forsaken during this generalization. Here, we propose…
Elections play a fundamental role in democratic societies, however they are often characterized by unexpected results. Here we discuss an election campaign model inspired by the compartmental epidemiology, and we show that the model…
The disjunction effect in human decision making is often taken to show that the classical law of total probability is violated, motivating quantum-like models. We re-examine this claim for the Prisoner's Dilemma disjunction effect. Under…