Related papers: TU-games with utilities: the prenucleolus and its …

Pursuing a new approach to the study of infinite games in combinatorics, we introduce the categories $\mathbf{Game}_{A}$ and $\mathbf{Game}_{B}$ and improve some classical results concerning topological games related to the duality between…

Hedonic games -- at the interface of cooperative game theory and computational social choice -- are coalition formation games in which the players have preferences over the coalitions they can join. Kerkmann et al. [13] introduced…

Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function u that took into account distances in a given social network. In this…

In this paper, we consider a generalization of cooperative games to the case where a coalition can distribute the earned utility not only among its members but also to other players. In particular, we consider an example where coalitions…

Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in…

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player $i$'s prediction…

Nowadays game engines are imperative for building 3D applications and games. This is for the reason that the engines appreciably reduce resources for employing obligatory but intricate utilities. This paper elucidates about a game engine…

This paper introduces a geometric framework for analyzing power relations in games, independent of their strategic form. We define a canonical preference space where each player's relational stance is a normalized vector. This model…

We introduce the notion of universal graphs as a tool for constructing algorithms solving games of infinite duration such as parity games and mean payoff games. In the first part we develop the theory of universal graphs, with two goals:…

We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase of negotiations before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, in order…

Game-theoretic centrality is a flexible and sophisticated approach to identify the most important nodes in a network. It builds upon the methods from cooperative game theory and network theory. The key idea is to treat nodes as players in a…

The paper uses a non-cooperative simultaneous game for coalition structure formation (Levando, 2016) to demonstrate some applications of the introduced game: a cooperation, a Bayesian game within a coalition with intra-coalition…

We demonstrate that a ubiquitous feature of network games, bilateral strategic interactions, is equivalent to having player utilities that are additively separable across opponents. We distinguish two formal notions of bilateral strategic…

We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…

We introduce and investigate a range of general notions of a game. Our principal notion is based on a set of agents modifying a relational structure in a discrete evolution sequence. We also introduce and study a variety of ways to model…

Nguyen et al. [1] introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents' utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation…

In this paper, we approach the classical problem of clustering using solution concepts from cooperative game theory such as Nucleolus and Shapley value. We formulate the problem of clustering as a characteristic form game and develop a…

In this paper we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with a priori unions. In the case of the equal…

This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems…

This paper describes a basic model of a gift economy in the shape of a Giving Game and reveals the fundamental structure of such a game. Main result is that the game shows a community effect in that a small subgroup of players eventually…