Related papers: A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Three-Gambler Rui…
Consider gambler's ruin with three players, 1, 2, and 3, having initial capitals $A$, $B$, and $C$ units. At each round a pair of players is chosen (uniformly at random) and a fair coin flip is made resulting in the transfer of one unit…
This work explains how to utilize earlier results by P. Diaconis, K. Houston-Edwards and the second author to estimate probabilities related to the 4-player gambler ruin problem. For instance, we show that the probability that a very…
In this paper we solve the three-player-game question. A three-player-game consists of a series of rounds. There are altogether three players. Two players participate in each round, at the end of the round the loser quits and the third…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
We study an elementary two-player card game where in each round players compare cards and the holder of the smallest card wins. Using the rate equations approach, we treat the stochastic version of the game in which cards are drawn…
We carry out a game-theoretic analysis of the recursive game "Guts," a variant of poker featuring repeated play with possibly growing stakes. An interesting aspect of such games is the need to account for funds lost to all players if…
We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple…
A gambler with an initial fortune $x$ starts by betting a dollar, then doubles the bet after every win and halves the bet after every loss. Let $p\in (0,1)$ be the probability of winning for each round. We show that the gambler survives…
We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…
We formulate and study a two-player static duel game as a nonzero-sum discounted stochastic game. Players $P_{1},P_{2}$ are standing in place and, in each turn, one or both may shoot at the other player. If $P_{n}$ shoots at $P_{m}$ ($m\neq…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
A multi-player competitive Dynkin stopping game is constructed. Each player can either exit the game for a fixed payoff, determined a priori, or stay and receive an adjusted payoff depending on the decision of other players. The single…
We give explicit formulas for ruin probabilities in a multidimensional Generalized Gambler's ruin problem. The generalization is best interpreted as a game of one player against $d$ other players, allowing arbitrary winning and losing…
Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…
Consider the following game between a random player R and a deterministic player D. There is a pile of n elements at the beginning. The rules for playing are as follows: In each turn of R, if the pile contains exactly m elements, R removes…
We consider a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two players (A and B) have the same payoff functions, and Player C does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$'s and $s_i$'s for $i=A, B, C$.…
Using experimental mathematics and symbolic computation, we derive many moments for the duration of a three player (fair) gambler's ruin.
We study variants of a stochastic game inspired by backgammon where players may propose to double the stake, with the game state dictated by a one-dimensional random walk. Our variants allow for different numbers of proposals and different…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…