Related papers: Exponential Lower Bounds on the Double Oracle Algo…

Two-team zero-sum games are one of the most important paradigms in game theory. In this paper, we focus on finding an unexploitable equilibrium in large team games. An unexploitable equilibrium is a worst-case policy, where members in the…

This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…

Pursuit-evasion scenarios appear widely in robotics, security domains, and many other real-world situations. We focus on two-player pursuit-evasion games with concurrent moves, infinite horizon, and discounted rewards. We assume that the…

This paper introduces algorithm instance games (AIGs) as a conceptual classification applying to games in which outcomes are resolved from joint strategies algorithmically. For such games, a fundamental question asks: How do the details of…

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…

We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…

We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in an imperfect information game (IIG) through self-play. Precisely, we focus on two-player, zero-sum, episodic, tabular IIG under the perfect-recall assumption where the only…

We prove the almost equivalence of the minimax theorem and the strong duality theorem for a large class of games and conic programs. The previous fundamental results on the equivalence of linear programming and two-player zero-sum games…

Regret minimization is a general approach to online optimization which plays a crucial role in many algorithms for approximating Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. The literature mainly focuses on solving individual games in…

Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game theory that finds applications in various scientific and engineering disciplines. A non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game model is presented…

In competitive two-agent environments, deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods based on the \emph{Double Oracle (DO)} algorithm, such as \emph{Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO)} and \emph{Anytime PSRO (APSRO)}, iteratively add RL best…

We prove that, assuming the exponential time hypothesis, finding an \epsilon-approximately optimal symmetric signaling scheme in a two-player zero-sum game requires quasi-polynomial time. This is tight by [Cheng et al., FOCS'15] and…

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…

We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…

In this paper we consider the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash Equilibrium of a zero-sum game in a payoff matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ with $O(1)$-bounded entries given access to a matrix-vector product oracle…

Equilibrium learning in adversarial games is an important topic widely examined in the fields of game theory and reinforcement learning (RL). Pursuit-evasion game (PEG), as an important class of real-world games from the fields of robotics…

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in turn-based stochastic multiplayer games with omega-regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval…

Regret-based algorithms are highly efficient at finding approximate Nash equilibria in sequential games such as poker games. However, most regret-based algorithms, including counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) and its variants, rely on…

We study deception in adversarial graph traversal, where a mobile agent seeks to reach a goal with minimum cost while an adversary alters edge costs to increase the total traversal cost. Unlike prior works that assume fixed…

Partially Observable Stochastic Games (POSGs) are the most general and common model of games used in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). We argue that the POSG model is conceptually ill suited to software MARL environments, and offer…