Related papers: Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti…
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process…
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
Elections and opinion polls often have many candidates, with the aim to either rank the candidates or identify a small set of winners according to voters' preferences. In practice, voters do not provide a full ranking; instead, each voter…
We present a new optimization-based method for aggregating preferences in settings where each voter expresses preferences over pairs of alternatives. Our approach to identifying a consensus partial order is motivated by the observation that…
This paper formalizes the lattice structure of the ballot voters cast in a ranked-choice election and the preferences that this structure induces. These preferences are shown to be counter to previous assumptions about the preferences of…
Iterative voting is a natural model of repeated strategic decision-making in social choice theory when agents have the opportunity to update their votes prior to finalizing the group decision. Prior work has analyzed the efficacy of…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
In this work we generalize standard Decision Theory by assuming that two outcomes can also be incomparable. Two motivating scenarios show how incomparability may be helpful to represent those situations where, due to lack of information,…
The metric distortion framework posits that n voters and m candidates are jointly embedded in a metric space such that voters rank candidates that are closer to them higher. A voting rule's purpose is to pick a candidate with minimum total…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly) asymmetric…
We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain…
It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…
We consider a school choice matching model where the priorities for schools are represented by binary relations that may not be weak order. We focus on the (total order) extensions of the binary relations. We introduce a class of algorithms…
This paper considers the ranking problem of candidates for a certain position based on ballot papers filled by voters. We suggest a ranking procedure of alternatives using cooperative game theory methods. For this, it is necessary to…
In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. While this problem has attracted significant attention in recent…
We will investigate proof-theoretic and linguistic aspects of first-order linear logic. We will show that adding partial order constraints in such a way that each sequent defines a unique linear order on the antecedent formulas of a sequent…
An ordinal preference domain is a subset of preference orders that the voters are allowed to cast in an election. We introduce and study the notion of outer diversity of a domain and evaluate its value for a number of well-known structured…
A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the elected representatives. The disutility of a voter is…
We consider linear orders of finite alternatives constructed by aggregating individual preferences. Specifically, we focus on linear orders that respect modified collective preference relations derived from supermajority rules, where…