Related papers: Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti…
In allocating objects via lotteries, it is common to consider ordinal rules that rely solely on how agents rank degenerate lotteries. While ordinality is often imposed due to cognitive or informational constraints, we provide another…
This note characterizes every qualified majority voting rule in environments with just two alternatives through anonymity, responsiveness, and q-neutrality. Crucially, the latter imposes independence of the labels of the alternatives if and…
We study here preference revision, considering both the monotonic case where the original preferences are preserved and the nonmonotonic case where the new preferences may override the original ones. We use a relational framework in which…
In this paper, we study voting rules on the interval domain, where the alternatives are arranged according to an externally given strict total order and voters report intervals of this order to indicate the alternatives they support. For…
May's classical theorem states that in a single-winner choose-one voting system with just two candidates, majority rule is the only social choice function satisfying anonimity, neutrality and positive responsiveness axiom. Anonimity and…
Methods for choosing from a set of options are often based on a strict partial order on these options, or on a set of such partial orders. I here provide a very general axiomatic characterisation for choice functions of this form. It…
May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to…
The Possible Winner (PW) problem, a fundamental algorithmic problem in computational social choice, concerns elections where voters express only partial preferences between candidates. Via a sequence of investigations, a complete…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
We examine vote delegation when preferences of agents are private information. One group of agents (delegators) does not want to participate in voting and abstains under conventional voting or can delegate its votes to the other group…
Given a set of n balls each colored with a color, a ball is said to be majority, k-majority, plurality if its color class has size larger than half of the number of balls, has size at least k, has size larger than any other color class;…
Classical voting rules assume that ballots are complete preference orders over candidates. However, when the number of candidates is large enough, it is too costly to ask the voters to rank all candidates. We suggest to fix a rank k, to ask…
We provide elementary proofs of several results concerning the possible outcomes arising from a fixed profile within the class of positional voting systems. Our arguments enable a simple and explicit construction of paradoxical profiles,…
Emerging methods for participatory algorithm design have proposed collecting and aggregating individual stakeholder preferences to create algorithmic systems that account for those stakeholders' values. Using algorithmic student assignment…
We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are…
We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive at most one. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial…
Most of the stochastic orders for comparing random variables, considered in the literature, are afflicted with two main drawbacks: (i) lack of connex property and (ii) lack of consideration of any dependence structure between the random…
Lu and Boutilier proposed a novel approach based on "minimax regret" to use classical score based voting rules in the setting where preferences can be any partial (instead of complete) orders over the set of alternatives. We show here that…
Qualitative and quantitative approaches to reasoning about uncertainty can lead to different logical systems for formalizing such reasoning, even when the language for expressing uncertainty is the same. In the case of reasoning about…
In the theory of social choice the research is focused around the projection of individual preference orders to the social preference order. Also, the justification of the preference order formalism begins with the concept of utility i.e.…