Related papers: Complete Game Logic with Sabotage
Logit dynamics is a form of randomized game dynamics where players have a bias towards strategic deviations that give a higher improvement in cost. It is used extensively in practice. In congestion (or potential) games, the dynamics…
Recent incidents such as the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack and the SolarWinds hack have shown that traditional defense techniques are becoming insufficient to deter adversaries of growing sophistication. Proactive and deceptive…
Leader-follower general-sum stochastic games (LF-GSSGs) model sequential decision-making under asymmetric commitment, where a leader commits to a policy and a follower best responds, yielding a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) with…
This paper investigates first-order game logic and first-order modal mu-calculus, which extend their propositional modal logic counterparts with first-order modalities of interpreted effects such as variable assignments. Unlike in the…
Dialogue games are two-player logic games between a Proponent who puts forward a logical formula A as valid or true and an Opponent who disputes this. An advantage of the dialogical approach is that it is a uniform framework from which…
Game theory is a powerful framework for reasoning about strategic interactions, with applications in domains ranging from day-to-day life to international politics. However, applying formal reasoning tools in such contexts is challenging,…
We study variants of regular infinite games where the strict alternation of moves between the two players is subject to modifications. The second player may postpone a move for a finite number of steps, or, in other words, exploit in his…
In the same sense as classical logic is a formal theory of truth, the recently initiated approach called computability logic is a formal theory of computability. It understands (interactive) computational problems as games played by a…
Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…
This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to…
Despite the success of generative adversarial networks (GANs) in generating visually appealing images, they are notoriously challenging to train. In order to stabilize the learning dynamics in minimax games, we propose a novel recursive…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
We study the problem of guaranteeing low regret in repeated games against an opponent with unknown membership in one of several classes. We add the constraint that our algorithm is non-exploitable, in that the opponent lacks an incentive to…
Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
This paper shows connections between command injection attacks, continuations, and the Lambek calculus: certain command injections, such as the tautology attack on SQL, are shown to be a form of control effect that can be typed using the…
Game theory provides a mathematical framework for analysing strategic situations involving at least two players. Normal-form games model situations where the players simultaneously pick their moves. In this thesis we explore the strategic…
Substitutions play a crucial role in a wide range of contexts, from analyzing the dynamics of social opinions and conducting mathematical computations to engaging in game-theoretical analysis. For many situations, considering one-step…
Simple stochastic games are turn-based 2.5-player games with a reachability objective. The basic question asks whether one player can ensure reaching a given target with at least a given probability. A natural extension is games with a…
In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…
LLMs are increasingly used in applications where they interact with humans and other agents. We propose to use behavioural game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behaviour. We let different LLMs play finitely repeated…