Related papers: Mean Field Correlated Imitation Learning
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…
Mean field games (MFGs) offer a powerful framework for modeling large-scale multi-agent systems. This paper addresses MFGs formulated in continuous time with discrete state spaces, where agents' dynamics are governed by continuous-time…
The framework of Mean-field Games (MFGs) is used for modelling the collective dynamics of large populations of non-cooperative decision-making agents. We formulate and analyze a kinetic MFG model for an interacting system of non-cooperative…
Mean field games (MFGs) describe the collective behavior of large populations of interacting agents. In this work, we tackle ill-posed inverse problems in potential MFGs, aiming to recover the agents' population, momentum, and environmental…
The mean-field framework has been used to find approximate solutions to problems involving very large populations of symmetric, anonymous agents, which may be intractable by other methods. The cooperative mean-field control (MFC) problem…
Imitation learning (IL) is a framework that learns to imitate expert behavior from demonstrations. Recently, IL shows promising results on high dimensional and control tasks. However, IL typically suffers from sample inefficiency in terms…
Multi-agent imitation learning (MA-IL) aims to learn optimal policies from expert demonstrations of interactions in multi-agent interactive domains. Despite existing guarantees on the performance of the resulting learned policies,…
When controlling multi-agent systems, the trade-off between performance and scalability is a major challenge. Here, we address this difficulty by using mean field games (MFGs), which is a framework that deduces the macroscopic dynamics…
In this paper, we use mean field games (MFGs) to investigate approximations of $N$-player games with uniformly symmetrically continuous heterogeneous closed-loop actions. To incorporate agents' risk aversion (beyond the classical expected…
Financial markets are often driven by latent factors which traders cannot observe. Here, we address an algorithmic trading problem with collections of heterogeneous agents who aim to perform optimal execution or statistical arbitrage, where…
While the topic of mean-field games (MFGs) has a relatively long history, heretofore there has been limited work concerning algorithms for the computation of equilibrium control policies. In this paper, we develop a computable policy…
We consider a multi-agent Markov strategic interaction over an infinite horizon where agents can be of multiple types. We model the strategic interaction as a mean-field game in the asymptotic limit when the number of agents of each type…
In this paper, we consider a finite horizon, non-stationary, mean field games (MFG) with a large population of homogeneous players, sequentially making strategic decisions, where each player is affected by other players through an aggregate…
This paper studies two fundamental problems in regularized Graphon Mean-Field Games (GMFGs). First, we establish the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of any $\lambda$-regularized GMFG (for $\lambda\geq 0$). This result relies on weaker…
Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading…
Mean field control (MFC) is an effective way to mitigate the curse of dimensionality of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) problems. This work considers a collection of $N_{\mathrm{pop}}$ heterogeneous agents that can be…
In this paper, we consider a mean field game (MFG) model perturbed by small common noise. Our goal is to give an approximation of the Nash equilibrium strategy of this game using a solution from the original no common noise MFG whose…
In this paper, we present a model of a game among teams. Each team consists of a homogeneous population of agents. Agents within a team are cooperative while the teams compete with other teams. The dynamics and the costs are coupled through…
We study policy optimization in Stackelberg mean field games (MFGs), a hierarchical framework for modeling the strategic interaction between a single leader and an infinitely large population of homogeneous followers. The objective can be…
This paper studies the problem of decentralized learning of Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) in aggregative Markov games (AMGs), where each agent's instantaneous reward depends only on its own action and an aggregate quantity. Existing…