Related papers: Leveraging Team Correlation for Approximating Equi…

Markov games with coupling constraints model constrained dynamical decision-making involving self-interested agents, where the feasibility of an individual agent's strategy depends on the joint strategies of the others. Such games arise in…

We study a two-player zero-sum game in which the row player aims to maximize their payoff against a competing column player, under an unknown payoff matrix estimated through bandit feedback. We propose three algorithms based on the…

Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in…

In many game settings, the game is not explicitly given but is only accessible by playing it. While there have been impressive demonstrations in such settings, prior techniques have not offered safety guarantees, that is, guarantees on the…

We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. We say that two games are "strategically equivalent" if, for every…

The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…

Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…

Adversarial multiplayer games are an important object of study in multiagent learning. In particular, polymatrix zero-sum games are a multiplayer setting where Nash equilibria are known to be efficiently computable. Towards understanding…

We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…

The peculiarity of adversarial team games resides in the asymmetric information available to the team members during the play, which makes the equilibrium computation problem hard even with zero-sum payoffs. The algorithms available in the…

We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible. A previous work on this model…

Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…

This paper extends Berge's maximum theorem for possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded cost functions to minimax problems and studies applications of these extensions to two-player zero-sum games with possibly noncompact action sets…

In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…

We consider $\epsilon$-equilibria notions for constant value of $\epsilon$ in $n$-player $m$-actions games where $m$ is a constant. We focus on the following question: What is the largest grid size over the mixed strategies such that…

Designing protocols enhancing cooperation for multi-agent systems remains a grand challenge. Cheap talk, defined as costless, non-binding communication before formal action, serves as a pivotal solution. However, existing theoretical…

This paper investigates the leader-following consensus problem for a class of multi-agent systems subject to adversarial attack-like external inputs. To address this, we formulate the robust leader-following control problem as a global…

Many emerging problems involve teams of agents taking part in a game. Such problems require a stochastic analysis with regard to the correlation structures among the agents belonging to a given team. In the context of Standard Borel spaces,…