Related papers: Leveraging Team Correlation for Approximating Equi…

Finding equilibrium points in continuous minmax games has become a key problem within machine learning, in part due to its connection to the training of generative adversarial networks and reinforcement learning. Because of existence and…

Quantitative games are two-player zero-sum games played on directed weighted graphs. Total-payoff games (that can be seen as a refinement of the well-studied mean-payoff games) are the variant where the payoff of a play is computed as the…

The known results regarding two-player zero-sum games are naturally generalized in complex space and are presented through a complete compact theory. The payoff function is defined by the real part of the payoff function in the real case,…

We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, the convergence of the…

We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…

This paper presents new families of algorithms for the repeated play of two-agent (near) zero-sum games and two-agent zero-sum stochastic games. For example, the family includes fictitious play and its variants as members. Commonly, the…

In the context of simple finite-state discrete time systems, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called correlated solution, which can be seen as the mean field game analogue of a correlated equilibrium. Our notion of…

We analyze the problem of identifying large cliques in graphs that are affected by adversarial uncertainty. More specifically, we consider a new formulation, namely the adversarial maximum clique problem, which extends the classical…

Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…

Von Neumann's Min-Max Theorem guarantees that each player of a zero-sum matrix game has an optimal mixed strategy. This paper gives an elementary proof that each player has a near-optimal mixed strategy that chooses uniformly at random from…

We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE…

In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

Probabilistic timed automata are a suitable formalism to model systems with real-time, nondeterministic and probabilistic behaviour. We study two-player zero-sum games on such automata where the objective of the game is specified as the…

We analyze the problem of computing a correlated equilibrium that optimizes some objective (e.g., social welfare). Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] gave a sufficient condition for the tractability of this problem; however, this…

In zero-sum games, the optimal strategy is well-defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, it is overly conservative when playing against suboptimal opponents and it can not exploit their weaknesses. Limited look-ahead game solving in…

This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…

In this paper, we study the class of games known as hidden-role games in which players are assigned privately to teams and are faced with the challenge of recognizing and cooperating with teammates. This model includes both popular…