Related papers: Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary socia…
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…
Algorithmic fairness in decision-making has been studied extensively in static settings where one-shot decisions are made on tasks such as classification. However, in practice most decision-making processes are of a sequential nature, where…
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…
Priority-based allocation of individuals to positions are pervasive, and elimination of justified envy is often, an absolute requirement. This leaves serial dictatorship (SD) as the only rule that avoids justified envy under standard direct…
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities…
In this work, we consider a binary hypothesis testing problem involving a group of human decision-makers. Due to the nature of human behavior, each human decision-maker observes the phenomenon of interest sequentially up to a random length…
Classical results in voting theory show that strategic manipulation by voters is inevitable if a voting rule simultaneously satisfy certain desirable properties. Motivated by this, we study the relevant question of how often a voting rule…
Multi-winner voting plays a crucial role in selecting representative committees based on voter preferences. Previous research has predominantly focused on single-stage voting rules, which are susceptible to manipulation during preference…
Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting…
A new unequal probability sampling method is proposed. This method is sequential. The decision to select or not each unit is made based on the order in which the units appear. A variant of this method allows selecting a sample from a…
In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…
Multi-winner approval-based voting has received considerable attention recently. A voting rule in this setting takes as input ballots in which each agent approves a subset of the available alternatives and outputs a committee of…
Computability logic (CL) (see http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~giorgi/cl.html) is a semantical platform and research program for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to the formal theory of truth which it has more…
We investigate binary voting systems with two types of voters and a hierarchy among the members in each type, so that members in one class have more influence or importance than members in the other class. The purpose of this paper is to…
We study the task of electing egalitarian sequences of $\tau$ committees given a set of agents with additive utilities for candidates available on each of $\tau$ levels. We introduce several rules for electing an egalitarian committee…
Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…
We consider a ranking and selection (R&S) problem with the goal to select a system with the largest or smallest expected performance measure among a number of simulated systems with a pre-specified probability of correct selection. Fully…
We propose a framework for probability aggregation based on propositional probability logic. Unlike conventional judgment aggregation, which focuses on static rationality, our model addresses dynamic rationality by ensuring that collective…
We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three…
Bisimulation is crucial for verifying process equivalence in probabilistic systems. This paper presents a novel logical framework for analyzing bisimulation in probabilistic parameterized systems, namely, infinite families of finite-state…