Properties of Egalitarian Sequences of Committees: Theory and Experiments
Computer Science and Game Theory
2025-08-21 v1 Data Structures and Algorithms
Abstract
We study the task of electing egalitarian sequences of committees given a set of agents with additive utilities for candidates available on each of levels. We introduce several rules for electing an egalitarian committee sequence as well as properties for such rules. We settle the computational complexity of finding a winning sequence for our rules and classify them against our properties. Additionally, we transform sequential election data from existing election data from the literature. Using this data set, we compare our rules empirically and test them experimentally against our properties.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2508.14439,
title = {Properties of Egalitarian Sequences of Committees: Theory and Experiments},
author = {Paula Böhm and Robert Bredereck and Till Fluschnik},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2508.14439},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
A short version was published in the proceedings of ECAI '25