English

Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees

Computer Science and Game Theory 2025-05-27 v1 Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

In a recently introduced model of successive committee elections (Bredereck et al., AAAI-20) for a given set of ordinal or approval preferences one aims to find a sequence of a given length of "best" same-size committees such that each candidate is a member of a limited number of consecutive committees. However, the practical usability of this model remains limited, as the described task turns out to be NP-hard for most selection criteria already for seeking committees of size three. Non-trivial or somewhat efficient algorithms for these cases are lacking too. Motivated by a desire to unlock the full potential of the described temporal model of committee elections, we devise (parameterized) algorithms that effectively solve the mentioned hard cases in realistic scenarios of a moderate number of candidates or of a limited time horizon.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2505.18287,
  title  = {Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees},
  author = {Pallavi Jain and Andrzej Kaczmarczyk},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.18287},
  year   = {2025}
}

Comments

18 pages; 3 figures, accepted for publication in IJCAI-25

R2 v1 2026-07-01T02:34:45.912Z