Related papers: Nash Equilibrium and Learning Dynamics in Three-Pl…
This article introduces a class of $Nash$ games among $Stackelberg$ players ($NASPs$), namely, a class of simultaneous non-cooperative games where the players solve sequential Stackelberg games. Specifically, each player solves a…
We study the asymptotic behavior of deterministic, continuous-time imitation dynamics for population games over networks. The basic assumption of this learning mechanism -- encompassing the replicator dynamics -- is that players belonging…
The behaviour of multi-agent learning in many player games has been shown to display complex dynamics outside of restrictive examples such as network zero-sum games. In addition, it has been shown that convergent behaviour is less likely to…
In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
Several multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms have been proposed to optimize agents decisions. Due to the complexity of the problem, the majority of the previously developed MARL algorithms assumed agents either had some…
We consider quadratic, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems with symmetric interactions among the agents. Albeit this class of games is known to admit a potential function, its formal expression can be unavailable in several…
We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…
We are concerned with finding Nash Equilibria in agent-based multi-cluster games, where agents are separated into distinct clusters. While the agents inside each cluster collaborate to achieve a common goal, the clusters are considered to…
We explore the use of policy approximations to reduce the computational cost of learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games. We propose a new Q-learning type algorithm that uses a sequence of entropy-regularized soft policies to…
We consider a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two players (A and B) have the same payoff functions, and Player C does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$'s and $s_i$'s for $i=A, B, C$.…
We consider a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. There are $n$ players, $n\geq 3$. Each player is denoted by $i$. Two strategic variables are $t_i$ and $s_i$, $i\in \{1, \dots, n\}$. They are related by…
In this paper, we investigate a class of nonzero-sum dynamic stochastic games, where players have linear dynamics and quadratic cost functions. The players are coupled in both dynamics and cost through a linear regression (weighted average)…
Nash equilibrium has long been a desired solution concept in multi-player games, especially for those on continuous strategy spaces, which have attracted a rapidly growing amount of interests due to advances in research applications such as…
In large systems, it is important for agents to learn to act effectively, but sophisticated multi-agent learning algorithms generally do not scale. An alternative approach is to find restricted classes of games where simple, efficient…
Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we…
In this paper we study the N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game ($N\geq 3$) in continuous time, which is a non-cooperative game where the strategies are stopping times. We show that the game has a Nash equilibrium point for general payoff…
We consider a game-theoretic model of information retrieval with strategic authors. We examine two different utility schemes: authors who aim at maximizing exposure and authors who want to maximize active selection of their content (i.e.…
Of paramount importance in both ecological systems and economic policies are the problems of harvesting of natural resources. A paradigmatic situation where this question is raised is that of fishing strategies. Indeed, overfishing is a…
We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…