Related papers: Nash Equilibrium and Learning Dynamics in Three-Pl…

When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…

This paper tackles the problem of adversarial examples from a game theoretic point of view. We study the open question of the existence of mixed Nash equilibria in the zero-sum game formed by the attacker and the classifier. While previous…

When people play a repeated game they usually try to anticipate their opponents' moves based on past observations, and then decide what action to take next. Behavioural economics studies the mechanisms by which strategic decisions are taken…

In this paper, we delve into the problem of using monetary incentives to encourage players to shift from an initial Nash equilibrium to a more favorable one within a game. Our main focus revolves around computing the minimum reward required…

Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…

Network games provide a framework to study strategic decision making processes that are governed by structured interdependencies among agents. However, existing models do not account for environments in which agents simultaneously interact…

We consider a tournament among four equally strong semifinalists. The players have to decide how much stamina to use in the semifinals, provided that the rest is available in the final and the third-place playoff. We investigate optimal…

The design of Nash equilibrium seeking strategies for games in which the involved players are of second-order integrator-type dynamics is investigated in this paper. Noticing that velocity signals are usually noisy or not available for…

We consider learning Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum Markov Games with nonlinear function approximation, where the action-value function is approximated by a function in a Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS). The key challenge is…

We propose a new dynamics for equilibrium selection of finite player discrete strategy games. The dynamics is motivated by optimal transportation, and models individual players' myopicity, greedy and uncertainty when making decisions. The…

We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical…

Distributed optimization and Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems have drawn much attention in the control community recently. This paper studies a class of non-cooperative games, known as N-cluster game, which subsumes both cooperative…

Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and the problem is to determine if there exist payoffs for the…

If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support…

This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to…

The concept of leader--follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real--world applications of game theory. While the case with a single follower has been thoroughly investigated, results with multiple…

We train two neural networks adversarially to play static games. At each iteration, a row and column network observe a new random bimatrix game and output individual mixed strategies. The parameters of each network are independently updated…

We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…

Individuals, or organizations, cooperate with or compete against one another in a wide range of practical situations. Such strategic interactions are often modeled as games played on networks, where an individual's payoff depends not only…

We study multi-strategies in multiplayer reachability games played on finite graphs. A multi-strategy prescribes a set of possible actions, instead of a single action as usual strategies: it represents a set of all strategies that are…