Related papers: Algorithmic Cheap Talk
This paper investigates how an autonomous agent can transmit information through its motion in an adversarial setting. We consider scenarios where an agent must reach its goal while deceiving an intelligent observer about its destination.…
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
We consider a multi-agent system in which a decentralized team of agents controls a stochastic system in the presence of an adversary. Instead of committing to a fixed information sharing protocol, the agents can strategically decide at…
We initiate the study of Bayesian conversations, which model interactive communication between two strategic agents without a mediator. We compare this to communication through a mediator and investigate the settings in which a mediation…
Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we unearth a folk theorem: if they are sufficiently patient,…
I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately and partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. The cost of running an experiment is the expected reduction of a weighted log-likelihood ratio function of the…
We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient allocations. The role of interaction in markets has received significant attention in economic thinking, e.g. in Hayek's 1945 classic paper. We…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
Agents learn about a changing state using private signals and their neighbors' past estimates of the state. We present a model in which Bayesian agents in equilibrium use neighbors' estimates simply by taking weighted sums with…
This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…
We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and that such pairwise…
In the autonomous driving area, interaction between vehicles is still a piece of puzzle which has not been fully resolved. The ability to intelligently and safely interact with other vehicles can not only improve self driving quality but…
The process of state preparation, its transmission and subsequent measurement can be classically simulated through the communication of some amount of classical information. Recently, we proved that the minimal communication cost is the…
This thesis is concerned with the design of distributed algorithms for solving optimization problems. We consider networks where each node has exclusive access to a cost function, and design algorithms that make all nodes cooperate to find…
We study a reputational cheap-talk environment in which a judge, who is privately and imperfectly informed about a state, must choose between two speakers of unknown reliability. Exactly one speaker is an expert who perfectly observes the…
Event-based state estimation can achieve estimation quality comparable to traditional time-triggered methods, but with a significantly lower number of samples. In networked estimation problems, this reduction in sampling instants does,…
Human-computer interactive systems that rely on machine learning are becoming paramount to the lives of millions of people who use digital assistants on a daily basis. Yet, further advances are limited by the availability of data and the…
Two mobile agents, starting at arbitrary, possibly different times from arbitrary nodes of an unknown network, have to meet at some node. Agents move in synchronous rounds: in each round an agent can either stay at the current node or move…
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is…
We study a Bayesian persuasion model with two-dimensional states of the world, in which the sender (she) and receiver (he) have heterogeneous prior beliefs and care about different dimensions. The receiver is a naive agent who has a…