Bayesian Conversations
Abstract
We initiate the study of Bayesian conversations, which model interactive communication between two strategic agents without a mediator. We compare this to communication through a mediator and investigate the settings in which a mediation can expand the range of implementable outcomes. We look into the eventual outcome of two-player games after interactive communication. We focus on games where only one agent has a non-trivial action and examine the performance of communication protocols that are individually rational (IR) for both parties. We characterize the structure of the social-welfare optimal protocol of a given number of rounds and thus show a separation between Bayesian conversation and mediated protocols. We demonstrate an example where the optimal conversation protocol requires infinitely many rounds of communication, and further show that for settings with binary actions and binary types, any optimal protocol either is finite (with at most 6 rounds) or requires infinitely many rounds of communication.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2307.08827,
title = {Bayesian Conversations},
author = {Renato Paes Leme and Jon Schneider and Heyang Shang and Shuran Zheng},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.08827},
year = {2025}
}