Related papers: Stable partitions for proportional generalized cla…
This paper develops a game-theoretic model and an agent-based model to study group formation driven by resource pooling, spatial cohesion, and heterogeneity. We focus on cross-sector partnerships (CSPs) involving public, private, and…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
We study a game theoretic model where a coalition of processors might collude to bias the outcome of the protocol, where we assume that the processors always prefer any legitimate outcome over a non-legitimate one. We show that the problems…
In this work, we investigate the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problems for $N$-coalition games with inequality constraints. First, we study the scenario where each agent in a coalition has full information of all…
We consider a large, homogeneous portfolio of life or disability annuity policies. The policies are assumed to be independent conditional on an external stochastic process representing the economic-demographic environment. Using a…
In order to study real-world systems, many applied works model them through signed graphs, i.e. graphs whose edges are labeled as either positive or negative. Such a graph is considered as structurally balanced when it can be partitioned…
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…
Competing bimodal coalitions among a group of actors are discussed. First, a model from political sciences is revisited. Most of the model statements are found not to be contained in the model. Second, a new coalition model is built. It…
A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality of Solid Coalitions (PSC). We characterize committees satisfying PSC as possible outcomes of the Minimal Demand rule, which generalizes an approach pioneered by Michael…
In the framework of transferable utility coalitional games, a scoring (characteristic) function determines the value of any subset/coalition of agents. Agents decide on both which coalitions to form and the allocations of the values of the…
Minimal balanced collections are a generalization of partitions of a finite set of n elements and have important applications in cooperative game theory and discrete mathematics. However, their number is not known beyond n = 4. In this…
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…
We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have…
Categories of partitions are combinatorial structures arising from the representation theory of certain compact quantum groups and are linked to classical diagram algebras such as the Temperley-Lieb algebra. In this paper, we present…
We study the proportional division value in TU-games, which distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to each player's stand-alone worth. Focusing on fixed-population consistency, we characterize the proportional division…
This paper addresses the benefit allocation in a mixed-energy truck platoon composed of fuel-powered and electric trucks. The interactions among trucks during platoon formation are modeled as a coalitional game with transferable utility. We…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
We consider coalition formation games in which each player has preferences over the other players and his preferences over coalitions are based on the best player ($\mathcal{B}$-/B-hedonic games) or the worst player ($\mathcal{W}$/W-hedonic…
The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an…
In network science, identifying optimal partitions of a signed network into internally cohesive and mutually divisive clusters based on generalized balance theory is computationally challenging. We reformulate and generalize two binary…