Related papers: On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Ze…

Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…

In this paper, we study multi-agent network games subject to affine time-varying coupling constraints and a time-varying communication network. We focus on the class of games adopting proximal dynamics and study their convergence to a…

Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate convergence guarantee in general games toward rationalizability,…

Learning from repeated play in a fixed two-player zero-sum game is a classic problem in game theory and online learning. We consider a variant of this problem where the game payoff matrix changes over time, possibly in an adversarial…

Classical objectives in two-player zero-sum games played on graphs often deal with limit behaviors of infinite plays: e.g., mean-payoff and total-payoff in the quantitative setting, or parity in the qualitative one (a canonical way to…

Scale-invariance in games has recently emerged as a widely valued desirable property. Yet, almost all fast convergence guarantees in learning in games require prior knowledge of the utility scale. To address this, we develop learning…

Learning in games refers to scenarios where multiple players interact in a shared environment, each aiming to minimize their regret. An equilibrium can be computed at a fast rate of $O(1/T)$ when all players follow the optimistic…

We generalize gradient descent with momentum for optimization in differentiable games to have complex-valued momentum. We give theoretical motivation for our method by proving convergence on bilinear zero-sum games for simultaneous and…

In this paper, online game is studied, where at each time, a group of players aim at selfishly minimizing their own time-varying cost function simultaneously subject to time-varying coupled constraints and local feasible set constraints.…

Long studied as a toy model, quantum zero-sum games have recently resurfaced as a canonical playground for modern areas such as non-local games, quantum interactive proofs, and quantum machine learning. In this simple yet fundamental…

In this paper, the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problem for continuous games with coupled affine inequality constraints is investigated in a partial-decision information scenario, where each player can only access its…

Our work focuses on extra gradient learning algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in bilinear zero-sum games. The proposed method, which can be formally considered as a variant of Optimistic Mirror Descent…

Regret Matching+ (RM+) and its variants are important algorithms for solving large-scale games. However, a theoretical understanding of their success in practice is still a mystery. Moreover, recent advances on fast convergence in games are…

Motivated by applications to data networks where fast convergence is essential, we analyze the problem of learning in generic N-person games that admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Specifically, we consider a scenario where…

We study two-player general sum repeated finite games where the rewards of each player are generated from an unknown distribution. Our aim is to find the egalitarian bargaining solution (EBS) for the repeated game, which can lead to much…

Motivated by the pursuit of a systematic computational and algorithmic understanding of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), we present a simple yet unified non-asymptotic local convergence theory for smooth two-player games, which…

We consider the setting where players run the Hedge algorithm or its optimistic variant to play an $n$-action game repeatedly for $T$ rounds. 1) For two-player games, we show that the regret of optimistic Hedge decays at $\tilde{O}( 1/T…

Learning in multi-player games can model a large variety of practical scenarios, where each player seeks to optimize its own local objective function, which at the same time relies on the actions taken by others. Motivated by the frequent…

We show that Optimistic Hedge -- a common variant of multiplicative-weights-updates with recency bias -- attains ${\rm poly}(\log T)$ regret in multi-player general-sum games. In particular, when every player of the game uses Optimistic…

Do boundedly rational players learn to choose equilibrium strategies as they play a game repeatedly? A large literature in behavioral game theory has proposed and experimentally tested various learning algorithms, but a comparative analysis…