Related papers: On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Ze…

We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. To incorporate function approximation, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward…

In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for…

Min-max optimization problems (i.e., min-max games) have attracted a great deal of attention recently as their applicability to a wide range of machine learning problems has become evident. In this paper, we study min-max games with…

In two-player zero-sum games, the learning dynamic based on optimistic Hedge achieves one of the best-known regret upper bounds among strongly-uncoupled learning dynamics. With an appropriately chosen learning rate, the social and…

A considerable chasm has been looming for decades between theory and practice in zero-sum game solving through first-order methods. Although a convergence rate of $T^{-1}$ has long been established, the most effective paradigm in practice…

This paper considers no-regret learning for repeated continuous-kernel games with lossy bandit feedback. Since it is difficult to give the explicit model of the utility functions in dynamic environments, the players' action can only be…

The stochastic momentum method is a commonly used acceleration technique for solving large-scale stochastic optimization problems in artificial neural networks. Current convergence results of stochastic momentum methods under non-convex…

Delays and asynchrony are inevitable in large-scale machine-learning problems where communication plays a key role. As such, several works have extensively analyzed stochastic optimization with delayed gradients. However, as far as we are…

Learning and computation of equilibria are central problems in game theory, theory of computation, and artificial intelligence. In this work, we introduce proximal regret, a new notion of regret based on proximal operators that lies…

This paper presents new families of algorithms for the repeated play of two-agent (near) zero-sum games and two-agent zero-sum stochastic games. For example, the family includes fictitious play and its variants as members. Commonly, the…

A variety of practical problems can be modeled by the decision-making process in multi-player games where a group of self-interested players aim at optimizing their own local objectives, while the objectives depend on the actions taken by…

This paper proposes Mutation-Driven Multiplicative Weights Update (M2WU) for learning an equilibrium in two-player zero-sum normal-form games and proves that it exhibits the last-iterate convergence property in both full and noisy feedback…

Owing to their connection with generative adversarial networks (GANs), saddle-point problems have recently attracted considerable interest in machine learning and beyond. By necessity, most theoretical guarantees revolve around…

We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…

We revisit the problem of solving two-player zero-sum games in the decentralized setting. We propose a simple algorithmic framework that simultaneously achieves the best rates for honest regret as well as adversarial regret, and in addition…

We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…

No-regret learning dynamics play a central role in game theory, enabling decentralized convergence to equilibrium for concepts such as Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) or Correlated Equilibrium (CE). In this work, we improve the…

Motivated by applications in Optimization, Game Theory, and the training of Generative Adversarial Networks, the convergence properties of first order methods in min-max problems have received extensive study. It has been recognized that…

This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…