Related papers: Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Com…

In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions…

A powerful feature in mechanism design is the ability to irrevocably commit to the rules of a mechanism. Commitment is achieved by public declaration, which enables players to verify incentive properties in advance and the outcome in…

Complete axiomatizations and exponential-time decision procedures are provided for reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge when there are infinitely many agents. The results show that reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge…

In this technical note, we first clarify a technical issue in the convergence proof of a free-will arbitrary time (FwAT) consensus law proposed recently in Pal et al. IEEE Trans. Cybern. (2020)[1], making the results questionable. We then…

We analyze conditional optimization problems arising in discrete time Principal-Agent problems of delegated portfolio optimization with linear contracts. Applying tools from Conditional Analysis we show that some results known in the…

In a delegation problem, a principal P with commitment power tries to pick one out of $n$ options. Each option is drawn independently from a known distribution. Instead of inspecting the options herself, P delegates the information…

In this paper, we present a probabilistic adaptation of an Assume/Guarantee contract formalism. For the sake of generality, we assume that the extended state machines used in the contracts and implementations define sets of runs on a given…

We establish an equivalence between two seemingly different theories: one is the traditional axiomatisation of incomplete preferences on horse lotteries based on the mixture independence axiom; the other is the theory of desirable gambles…

This paper studies preference aggregation under ambiguity when agents have incomplete preference relations due to imprecise beliefs. We introduce the "dual" of the Pareto principle, which respects unanimity among individuals, including…

Analogous to G\"odel's incompleteness theorems is a theorem in physics to the effect that the set of explanations of given evidence is uncountably infinite. An implication of this theorem is that contact between theory and experiment…

We identify a subtle security issue that impacts mechanism design in scenarios in which agents can absolutely commit to strategies. Absolute commitments allow the strategy of an agent to depend on the commitments made by the other agents.…

We consider the principal-agent problem with heterogeneous agents. Previous works assume that the principal signs independent incentive contracts with every agent to make them invest more efforts on the tasks. However, in many…

Standard decision theory seeks conditions under which a preference relation can be compressed into a single real-valued function. However, when preferences are incomplete or intransitive, a single function fails to capture the agent's…

Our recent minimal model of cooperation (P. Gawronski et al, Physica A 388 (2009) 3581) is modified as to allow for time-dependent altruism. This evolution is based on reputation of other agents, which in turn depends on history. We show…

The problem of peer prediction is to elicit information from agents in settings without any objective ground truth against which to score reports. Peer prediction mechanisms seek to exploit correlations between signals to align incentives…

Aumann's famous Agreeing to Disagree Theorem states that if a group of agents share a common prior, update their beliefs by Bayesian conditioning based on private information, and have common knowledge of their posterior beliefs regarding…

This paper studies the consensus problem for multiagent systems with transmission constraints. A novel model of multiagent systems is proposed where the information transmissions between agents are disturbed by irregular distortions or…

Default logic can be regarded as a mechanism to represent families of belief sets of a reasoning agent. As such, it is inherently second-order. In this paper, we study the problem of representability of a family of theories as the set of…

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, and the joint action induces outcomes according to an…

Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the…