Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions
Computer Science and Game Theory
2024-02-22 v1
Abstract
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, and the joint action induces outcomes according to an arbitrary distribution. We study two classes of mechanisms: a class of deterministic mechanisms that is the natural extension of single-agent contracts, in which the agents play a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the contract, and a class of randomized mechanisms that is inspired by single-agent randomized contracts and correlated equilibria.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2402.13824,
title = {Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions},
author = {Federico Cacciamani and Martino Bernasconi and Matteo Castiglioni and Nicola Gatti},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.13824},
year = {2024}
}