Related papers: Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Com…
A key challenge in the study of multiagent cooperation is the need for individual agents not only to cooperate effectively, but to decide with whom to cooperate. This is particularly critical in situations when other agents have hidden,…
We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…
Can a principal still offer optimal dynamic contracts that are linear in end-of-period outcomes when the agent controls a process that exhibits memory? We provide a positive answer by considering a general Gaussian setting where the output…
In many situations, both in human and artificial societies, cooperating agents have different status with respect to the activity and it is not uncommon that certain actions are only allowed to coalitions that satisfy certain criteria,…
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…
Prisoner's dilemma has been heavily studied. In classical model, each player chooses to either "Cooperate" or "Defect". In this paper, we generalize the prisoner's dilemma with a new alternative which is neither defect or cooperation. The…
In a framework close to the one developed by Holmstr\"om and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing…
This paper proposes a double-layered framework (or form of network) to integrate two mechanisms, termed consensus and conservation, achieving distributed solution of a linear equation. The multi-agent framework considered in the paper is…
When multiple informative equilibria are possible in a general cheap talk game, how much information can a principal guarantee herself? To answer this question, I define the notion of worst-case implementation-implementation via the worst…
This paper introduces assume/guarantee contracts on continuous-time control systems, hereby extending contract theories for discrete systems to certain new model classes and specifications. Contracts are regarded as formal characterizations…
Finding conditions ensuring consensus, i.e. convergence to a common value, for a networked system is of crucial interest, both for theoretical reasons and applications. This goal is harder to achieve when connections between agents are…
Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of the agents, the axiom of impartiality requires that the…
We study how governments promote social welfare through the design of contracting environments. We model the regulation of contracting as default delegation: the government chooses a delegation set of contract terms it is willing to…
We initiate the study of online contracts, which integrate the game-theoretic considerations of economic contract theory, with the algorithmic and informational challenges of online algorithm design. Our starting point is the classic online…
The paper studies the problem of achieving consensus in multi-agent systems in the case where the dependency digraph $\Gamma$ has no spanning in-tree. We consider the regularization protocol that amounts to the addition of a dummy agent…
In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives -- modeled as a set. In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by…
Algorithmic contract design studies scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to exert effort on her behalf. In this work, we focus on settings where the agent's type is drawn from an unknown distribution, and formalize an offline…
We show that in delegation problems, a principal benefits from belief misalignment vis-\`a-vis an agent when the latter can flexibly acquire costly information. The agent optimally succumbs to confirmatory learning, leading him to favor the…
We study the relations between a contract automata and an interaction model. In the former model, distributed services are abstracted away as automata - oblivious of their partners - that coordinate with each other through an orchestrator.…
Concurrent game frames are a standard semantic framework for logics of strategic reasoning. Two notions of coalition power can be derived from such frames: alpha powers and actual powers. An alpha power of a coalition is a set of possible…