Related papers: Self-Enforced Job Matching
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
This paper deals with two-sided matching market with two disjoint sets, i.e. the set of buyers and the set of sellers. Each seller can trade with at most with one buyer and vice versa. Money is transferred from sellers to buyers for an…
Automatic matching of job offers and job candidates is a major problem for a number of organizations and job applicants that if it were successfully addressed could have a positive impact in many countries around the world. In this context,…
Recent literature on computational notions of fairness has been broadly divided into two distinct camps, supporting interventions that address either individual-based or group-based fairness. Rather than privilege a single definition, we…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
Many interesting problems in the Internet industry can be framed as a two-sided marketplace problem. Examples include search applications and recommender systems showing people, jobs, movies, products, restaurants, etc. Incorporating…
In many centralized labor markets candidates interview with potential employers before matches are formed through a clearinghouse One prominent example is the market for medical residencies and fellowships, which in recent years has had a…
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the…
Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…
Person-job fit is the core technique of online recruitment platforms, which can improve the efficiency of recruitment by accurately matching the job positions with the job seekers. Existing works mainly focus on modeling the unidirectional…
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension…
In many matching markets, one side "applies" to the other, and these applications are often expensive and time-consuming (e.g. students applying to college). It is tempting to think that making the application process easier should benefit…
We introduce and study a new model that we call the {\em matching model}. Items arrive one by one in a buffer and depart from it as soon as possible but by pairs. The items of a departing pair are said to be {\em matched}. There is a finite…
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…
When recruiting job candidates, employers rarely observe their underlying skill level directly. Instead, they must administer a series of interviews and/or collate other noisy signals in order to estimate the worker's skill. Traditional…
Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…